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Automated separation assurance is the most mature concept to handle increasing airspace 
traffic and capacity needs, yet the system lacks a way to pre-emptively identify aircraft 
separation problems.  The intensity control measure looks to find situations where if an 
aircraft pair makes an unplanned change in heading or altitude at the wrong moment, an 
unrecoverable situation arises.  This research analyzes static, open loop air traffic data in 
an en-route sector to determine how many high intensity aircraft pairs (HIP) exist per 
minute, and if the intensity measure is a safely manageable function for air traffic 
controllers.  It is found that at current, 1.5x, and 2x traffic levels, it is possible for the 
number of HIP to reach a manageable level of 18 pairs per minute or less.  At 3x traffic, 
this manageable level does not occur.  It is also observed that the amount of variance in 
HIP per minute increases as the traffic level and number of aircraft per minute increases.    
Adjustments to the intensity control measure and specific characteristics of air traffic at 
the times when 18 or less HIP are present in current, 1.5x, and 2x traffic levels may 








 The most mature concept in automation separation assurance for Next Generation 
air traffic control (ATC) is the automated airspace concept (AAC) introduced by NASA 
and Erzberger (2009).  However, no functionality exists to pre-emptively identify 
separation risks before they occur.  This research aims to test whether or not the intensity 
control measure is a viable solution by analyzing if the number of high intensity aircraft 
pairs (HIP) per minute exceeds the threshold of a safe workload for humans. 
 In order to assign baseline criteria for what constitutes a HIP, experienced air 
traffic controllers are interviewed using semi-structured interviews and informal 
conversation.  Real open-loop air traffic data simulated through X-Plane is then analyzed 
to determine the number of HIP that occur per minute over a time period of 40 minutes.  
This data is then analyzed to determine if it is possible for human controllers to 










Next Generation Air Transportation System, or NextGen, aims to overall 
modernize the current air traffic control system across the United States.  The 
overarching goal is to transform the system from ground-based, as it is today, to a 
satellite based system.  The belief is that by moving to a satellite based system and 
utilizing global position systems (GPS) technology, air traffic control delays will 
decrease, planes will be able to fly closer together, overall airspace capacity will increase.  
As a result, controllers would be able to monitor and manage the air space with a higher 
degree of safety.   
In order to increase capacity in the National Air Space (NAS) system, changes 
must be made to the way aircraft are managed and separated in their sectors.  Currently, 
air traffic controllers manually monitor and manage each aircraft in his/her sector, 
keeping aircraft pairs separated from each other based on guidelines set forth by the 
Federal Aviation Administration, as well as personal judgment.  Controllers communicate 
navigational commands to pilots directly via radio in order to maintain these separation 
minima, and are held accountable for any violations of separation.  Each controller is able 
to handle between 12-18 aircraft in their sector at any given time without compromising 
safety of the overall system due to high workload (Erzberger, 2009) (Landry, 2012) 
(Wing et al., 2013).  Because of this human factors constraint, it is necessary to manage 
air traffic separation in an environment with increased capacity using a different tool 
Currently, the most developed concept for increasing the capacity of NextGen 
airspace is the automated airspace concept (AAC), which utilizes automated separation 
assurance (Erzberger, 2009).  In this most developed model, there are three major 




collisions and near-mid-air-collisions (NMACs) are avoided to maintain system safety.  
These three proposed components are autoresolver, the tactical separation assisted flight 
environment (TSAFE), and an automated collision avoidance system (ACAS) (Erzberger, 
Lauderdale, & Chu, 2010) (Figure 1).   
!
Figure 1: Illustration of ACAS 
 
The autoresolver and TSAFE work together to predict and resolve future losses of 
separation between pairs of aircraft.  ACAS detects rapid closure rates between aircraft 
pairs and aurally alerts pilots of the possibility of impending collision.  ACAS also 
aurally provides resolution maneuvers to avoid the conflict (Landry, 2012).  TSAFE and 
autoresolver evaluate the air traffic situations and potential conflicts in a primarily 
strategic timeframe (5 minutes to 2 hours ahead) while ACAS evaluates traffic situations 
on a tactical basis (0 – 5 minutes ahead).  Ideally, these systems would all work together 
in symphony to predict and detect future loses of separation/collision hazards between 
aircraft pairs, as well as recommended solutions to resolve the conflicts. 
However, these three systems have a series of flaws that can be categorized as 
either human-centric or design-centric.  From a human-centric perspective, the first issue 
is that they all lack a way to keep the human controller “in-the-loop” in NextGen systems.  
Secondly, none of these systems are able to act preemptively and can only identify a 
problem and solution once a problem has already occurred (Landry, 2012).  Both present 




awareness, as human monitoring of automation is notoriously poor (Parasuraman & Riley, 
1997).   
Furthermore, no work has been done to define or explain the failure rate of the 
automated separation assurance system.  If the controllers were to act solely as monitors 
to the automation and the system were to fail suddenly at a traffic level higher than 
controllers are able to manually handle, it is unlikely that any controller would be able to 
obtain full understanding of the airspace and begin to act appropriately to avoid safety 
hazards in an acceptable amount of time.  It is unreasonable to assume any human could 
monitor a system which they do not understand the reasoning or complexity of, and 
therefore, it is unreasonable to expect human controllers to monitor automated separation 
assurance functions.  By nature, the automated airspace system is designed to handle 
tasks that humans cannot do on their own, so the system is far too complex for a 
monitoring task (Landry, 2014).   
Additionally, human monitoring of automated systems and their ability to process 
pattern-formatted knowledge on the system without incremental failure of its parts (also 
known as graceful failure) is seriously compromised and becomes highly inadequate, so a 
sudden system failure would be a serious safety threat to the entire airspace system (Chen 
& Norcio, 1997).  
Beyond the situation awareness deficiency, there are concerns about skill 
degradation, as controllers would go from active players in the process with 100% 
participation to simple screen monitors, and it is possible that their learned skills with the 
systems and the complex workings of their sectors would degrade over time. In the event 
of system failure, this kind of degradation, coupled with the stress of the situation, could 
lead to errors, which would seriously compromise the safety of the airspace system.    
From the design-centric point of view, the system’s design has an innate inability 
to preemptively detect unsafe situations could result in the possibility that a loss of 
separation could occur in such a way that the automated system could not detect and 
resolve the situation in a safe, timely manner.  In such a situation, ACAS would be the 
only system available for conflict resolution, and this system has been proven unable to 




until a collision (Landry, 2012) .  Actively identifying situations where, if an aircraft 
were to blunder, an LOS or collision would be quickly imminent could increase the 
safety level of the NAS, as well as addressing all of the noted safety concerns associated 
with ACAS. 
 Additionally, it is extremely important that the new system implemented with 
AAC be as safe or safer than the current system.  The current system operates with a 
probability of mid-air collision on the order of 1x10!! per flight hour (Belle, Shortle, 
Yousefi, & Xie, 2012) (Shortle & Zhang, 2014).  This level of safety is generally 
established using quantitative methods such as reliability-based analysis (fault-trees, 
Markov chains, etc).  However, these kinds of methods utilize an evaluation of each piece 
of the system, and are only effective if the probability of failure of each component is 
known (Landry, 2012).   
A major flaw in AAC theory is that probabilistic conflict detection is not 
applicable, as it is near impossible to obtain a probability density function (PDF) that 
describes the likelihood of aircraft blunders, so the overall safety level of the system 
cannot be computed by automation alone.  Blunder errors are erratic and not normally 
distributed by nature, and therefore cannot be modeled as a continuous distribution and 
cannot be found within any meaning confidence bounds.  The large number of unknown 
variables that cause blunders makes a discrete distribution the only appropriate model, 
therefore rendering previously defined (Lauderdale & Erzberger, 2014) probabilistic 




Intensity Control Measure 
 
A potential solution that can solves the problems posed by the AAC theory is the 
introduction of the “intensity control measure” as a function for controllers to manually 
monitor (Landry, 2012).  The “intensity control measure” consists of a calculation that 
can be run concurrently with other AAC algorithms which would compute the amount of 
time that an aircraft pair has before, if either were to blunder (perform an unplanned 




would have less than 30 seconds to identify the problem, suggest a conflict-free solution, 
and execute the maneuver before a loss of separation (LOS) or collision would occur.   
 
!
Figure 2: Blundering aircraft example 
 
By allowing controllers to manually monitor this number for each aircraft pair in 
his sector, their experience and on-the-job knowledge could be utilized to intervene and 
increase separation for an aircraft pair they feel is approaching a critical time measure, all 
while allowing AAC to handle routine separation.   
The introduction of this method would help keep controllers involved and aware 
of their sector activity as well as putting a measure in place to preemptively watch for and 
resolve dangerous situations that may result in a rapid LOS (Landry, 2012).  
The intensity control measure can be computed using the following algorithm, 
which utilizes aircraft’s’ future position information given by systems such as Center-
TRACON Automation.  Given the future positions of an aircraft pair, the intensity 
number can be computed to show the minimum amount of time until a NMAC or 
collision would occur if either aircraft where to blunder in any possible direction. 
 
Minimize t = D-1 (500, !,!) 
s.t.        t≥ !/! 
 ! ∙ ! > 0 
 ! < ! < ! 
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 Ideally, each aircraft pair would have a minimum time to NMAC computed 
continuously, and within a sector, these intensity numbers would be available to help the 
system agents determine if the pairs require additional monitoring or spacing to avoid 
dangerous situations in the future.  An example of an intensity computation where 








Since a combination of automated and human tasks is the most likely form of 
AAC that will be safe enough to implement, a list of these intensity numbers to manage 
could be a manual task for ATC perform while AAC handles routine separation.  The 
notation of the intensity number is such that a small intensity number for an aircraft pair 
corresponds with a more critical situation.  That is, an aircraft pair with an intensity 
number of 4.3 is more critical an aircraft pair with an intensity number of 5.8. 
It is possible that an ideal intensity number exists; one where above it, spacing of 
aircraft pairs in the sector becomes so large that capacity is impacted, and where below it, 
safety is considered a risk for the pair.  For the purposes of this research, a higher 
intensity number is always considered Pareto optimal. 
The definition of intensity includes that the number defines a time until the 
aircraft could be 30 seconds or less away from a NMAC given a blunder, but it is 
important to note that the value of 30 seconds is a choice based on preliminary 
mathematical assessment, and is subject to potentially change.  It has been shown that 
looking for these pre-emptive safety issues above 30 seconds could impact the ability to 
add capacity to a sector due to spacing (Landry, 2012).  It is also worth noting that 30 
seconds would encompass two radar sweeps, as each one last around 12 seconds, where 
in the first radar sweep, the problem would be identified, and during the second radar 
sweep, the solution would be executed, with around six seconds of additional padding.   
A valid concern in the development and implementation of intensity as a function 
for controllers to monitor is if the levels of intensity would be too high for too many 
aircraft pairs in a high-traffic, increased capacity airspace, rendering controllers once 
again unable to safely manage their sector and handle the workload.   Intuitively, as the 
number of aircraft in a sector grows, the buffer between aircraft will shrink (although not 
below the standard separation minima).  Additionally, the time available until an aircraft 
pair reaches the critical moment where a blunder will cause of LOS or collision in 30 
seconds or less without action will naturally become smaller and smaller as their buffer 
decreases. 
Because the controllers would be required to visually scan for conditions, detect 




considered a task with high intrinsic demand (Embrey, Blackett, Marsden, & Peachey, 
2006).  Because of this, the hope is that situational awareness of a controller’s sector is 
not lost while managing intensity, as opposed to just simply monitoring the automated 
separation assurance system for errors.  Simply monitoring the automated system would 
involve tasks such as detection of audio alarms for error and performance of well-learned, 
highly routine activities, which are defined as tasks with low intrinsic demand, which 
result in lower engagement (Embrey et al., 2006). 
The intensity control measure adds a level visibility and awareness for situations 
similar to the one illustrated in Figure 4 (Landry, 2012).  Here, three aircraft are in close 
proximity to one another where aircraft 1, the central aircraft, is having its airspace 
breeched by aircraft 2.  The AAC system would catch this violation of aircraft 1’s 
airspace and most likely issue a directive to move aircraft 2 further away from aircraft 1.  
However, while aircraft 3 has not breeched aircraft 1’s space, if it were to miss its 
planned right turn, there would be an immediate LOS and a very small amount of time 
until a NMAC would occur, or potentially a collision.  This risk is not identified by AAC, 
but would be identified by the intensity control measure as a high-risk aircraft pair.  The 
controller may choose to simply keep an eye on the pair, may ask either aircraft so slow 
down or speed up, or may ask aircraft 3 to confirm its upcoming maneuver to help ensure 
a blunder is not made. 
!







In 2003, the United States Congress established the Joint Planning and 
Development office in order to oversee, plan, and execute the development of Next 
Generation Air Transportation Systems.  The major components of this NAS overhaul are 
automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B), System-Wide Information 
Management (SWIM), NextGen Data Communications, NextGen Network Enabled 
Weather, and NAS Voice Switch.  These elements are all elements of a plan to achieve 
several goals, which include trajectory based operations, collaborative air traffic 
management, a reduction in weather impacts, the ability to increase capacity at airports, 
and to rollout flexible terminals and airports.  The rollout for the project is slated from 
2012 through 2020, with a slow rollout of the various technologies and a mandate for 
compliance by 2020 (Administration, 2007).   
A large portion of the ability to achieve the goals of trajectory based operations 
and collaborative traffic management, along with capacity increases, hinge on the ability 
of air traffic management evolving towards automation.    Research regarding the 
evolution of NextGen all agrees that air traffic control will have to move to some level of 
automation, and most mention that the human controllers will need to have a role in the 
automated environment, but this task is not well discussed or well defined.    
There is also healthy debate about the distribution of the separation responsibility.  
Some work spells out an argument for a distributed workload, where pilots/flight deck 
technology and the ground-based system would work together to manage separation, 
some are proponents of free flight where aircraft would always self separate, and others 
argue that the ground based system should maintain responsibility for all separation. 
The idea of automating air traffic control has been a topic of discussion well 
before the NextGen initiative was announcing in 2003, however.  Erzberger (1995) first 
began discussing the idea of Automated Air Traffic Management by presenting a 
rudimentary design principal and algorithm for a real time scheduler.  At this time, the 
primary object was to find ideal or favorable landing scenarios for aircraft and schedule 
them in a sequence that minimizes delays throughout the airspace system.  This early 




not on increasing capacity, but merely increasing efficiency and minimizing operational 
costs for airports and airlines.   
The proposed design and algorithm go so far as to assign ideal runways to aircraft 
approaching to land, although the simulation run only encompasses a single runway 
airport and acknowledges that a larger airport with more runways would be significantly 
more complex.   
This research also proposes “meter gates” which are basically gates where aircraft 
would enter for sequencing and runway assignments in the TRACON.  This work is also 
a precursor to future work being done in 4-D trajectory based operations, but it is the one 
of the earliest mentions of air traffic control done by automation (Erzberger, 1995). 
 The concept of automated conflict resolution is presented by Tomlin, Pappas, and 
Sastry (1998).  Air transportation systems were seeing a drastic rise in demand at the time, 
and were expected to grow by 3-5% over the next fifteen years.  The need for automation 
in air traffic control and aircraft separation is explained by inefficient airspace utilization, 
increased ATC workload, and obsolete technology.  Tomlin et al. suggests that free flight 
would help to reduce some of the rigidity in the current system, allowing aircraft to fly in 
the most favorable winds and routes as determined by the pilot.   
Furthermore, ATC are identified as frequently simplifying their heavy workload 
by putting aircraft in holds outside of the TRACON, which results in large delays in the 
system, and that the aging technology they use to manage aircraft is doing nothing to help 
them with their growing issues.  Under this free flight system where separation is 
automated, each aircraft would have two “bubble” like areas that theoretically surround 
it; a tight “protected zone” which if breached, would result in a LOS, and an “alert zone” 
which would result in a kind of warning to the involved aircraft if it were breached.   
Several innovative concepts are discussed here, such as a an algorithm to verify 
that a maneuver was executed in order to avoid a collision and the uncertainty in state or 
intent information, but this work does not address any function to keep human controlled 
in-the-loop, nor does this work address the inability to fully model the safety of the NAS 




 Erzberger first introduced the Automated Air Concept (AAC) in 2001.  This work 
focused on eliminating the human controller as the means for aircraft maintaining 
separation and replacing them with ground-based computers that would “issue clearances 
to the pilot via data link to provide separation assurances for properly equipped aircraft.” 
(Erzberger, 2001).   
Erzberger (2001) suggests that the ground-based computers and pilots are equally 
responsible for aircraft separation, and that by relieving the human controller of his duties 
in manually separating aircraft, a larger number of aircraft can operate in Automated 
Airspace sectors.  Erzberger admits the challenges of a large-scale component and 
equipment overhaul in order to implement the concept, and also that a safety net must be 
built for the event of failure.   
The AAC system architecture proposed in this work is made up of several 
components; the aircraft, Data Link, the AAC computer system, TSAFE, and a controller 
interface.  The proposed system would work in such a manner that the AAC system 
would issue a directive to the aircraft via Data Link, the aircraft would accept the 
maneuver and perform it in order to maintain separation.  Safety concerns are addressed 
here by the addition of the TSAFE function, which is described here as a monitoring 
system that would help avoid LOS caused by critical component failures, software 
crashes, or errors by the pilot.   
The controller would be expected to “accept separation responsibility” after any 
directives have been issued for maneuvers and that TSAFE has issued a clearance that the 
aircraft is not in any danger of a LOS.  However, when another directive must be issued, 
the aircraft will transfer back to the automated system to be managed.   
As described here, the controller would simply be a system monitor with no real 
task in the environment.  This work goes on to discuss that human controllers would 
manage unequipped aircraft separation, but does not address how these aircraft would 
interact with equipped aircraft.    Furthermore, this work does not describe a failure rate 
of the system, nor does it address the issues of poor human monitoring of automation and 




 Just prior to the formal committee forming and announcement of the FAA’s 
NextGen project, Erzberger and Paiell (2002) again addressed the need of a next 
generational air traffic control system to handle an increase in demand, the need for more 
capacity, and an improvement in efficiency and safety.   
In this work, the role of TSAFE expands to independently monitor the clearances 
and trajectories sent via Data Link to the aircraft by the automated system, and would 
also monitor conformances.  TSAFE would also issue warnings and advisories to pilots 
and controllers when needed.  This research further states that with the separation task off 
the controllers’ plate, they could focus on strategic traffic issues, such as flow 
management and pilot requests.   
The more developed AAC system described here would enable controllers to re-
route aircraft through the automated system by selecting conflict-free trajectories from 
the interface, coordinating the change with the pilot, and transmitting the new route via 
data link, but this would not be the controller’s main task.  Controllers would continue to 
manually separate unequipped aircraft, but beyond that, no task is defined to keep the 
controller active and engaged in the sector activity.  This work does not address a 
decrease in controller situational awareness resulting from low task engagement, and this 
work does not address the failure rate of the automated system, or how a controller would 
regain control in the event of such a failure (Erzberger & Paielli, 2002). 
 In 2004, NASA formally published a report in which they outlined a proposal to 
“transform the NAS” (Erzberger, 2004) using AAC as the next generation of air traffic 
control.  Here, it is stated that with this newly proposed system, pilots could request 
trajectory changes via data link, essentially downlinking their request to the ground based 
computer, where the computer would then check to make sure this request is conflict free, 
and then issue a clearance to the pilot to perform the maneuver or change of trajectory.   
Again, the separation assurance system, known as TSAFE, is listed as the back-up 
function if the ground-based system were to fail.  This research outlines the system in two 
time friends; strategic and tactical.  In the strategic timeframe, which ranges up to twenty 
minutes, the automated trajectory server (ATS), which is the ground-based system, would 




tactical timeframe, the LOS prediction range covers from 0-3 minutes, and resolutions are 
initiated when the time to LOS is less than one minute (Erzberger, 2004).   
Essentially, in the tactical timeframe, if a LOS is detected, the TSAFE system 
would have to recognize the future LOS, initiate a resolution, send the trajectory change 
to the involved aircraft via data link, the pilot or pilots would have to receive the directive, 
and successfully complete the maneuver in less than one minute in order to avoid a LOS.  
This work does not include any consideration or analysis of pilot workload under 
the introduction of these new tasks.  It also does not discuss a task or function for human 
controllers to perform other than monitoring the automated system. 
 Erzberger (2004) does acknowledge that the ATS ground-based system could fail 
for a number of reasons, stating that the software would most likely contain “more than a 
million lines of code” (Erzberger, 2004), and the reliability and operational limits are 
most likely not feasible to establish it as a sole line of defense.   
The redundant element suggested here is the TSAFE function.  Erzberger does 
suggest that TSAFE would contain a critical maneuvers function, which would monitor 
the possibility of high risk LOS if an aircraft were to not terminate its current maneuver 
when the termination state is reached.  That is, if an aircraft was cleared to climb from 
10,000 feet to 12,000 feet, but continued to climb past 12,000 feet, the system would 
attempt to be forward looking to determine if there is any LOS risk.  This is also known 
as the dead reckoning approach (Erzberger, 2004).   This work does not account for the 
possibility of a blunder, nor does it describe the failure rate for the ground-based system, 
or how a human controlled could regain control of the airspace if needed. 
 This work also explains a safety analysis done on the AAC system, as described 
by Erzberger (2004).  Four kinds of faults are identified which could result in a LOS; 
faults under normal conditions, faults due to incorrect information received by the aircraft, 
faults due to inability of aircraft to follow instructions, and faults due to ground system 
service interruption.  Although the procedure or experiment for testing the level of safety 
for the AAC system is not described, Erzberger (2004) states that the level of safety 
achieved by the AAC system “appears to be increased significantly by features such as 




trajectories when conflicts are detected, and extended conflict-free time horizons that 
allow traffic in the AAC controlled airspace to coast through ground system service 
interruptions with low collisions risk (Erzberger, 2004).”  The rigor applied to proving or 
supporting these statements is not provided. 
 Alternatively, Metzger and Parasuraman (2005) suggest that it is unlikely that 
these automated systems would be able to cope with all situations, no matter how capable 
they are programmed to.  It is noted that changes in pilot intent may not be received in a 
timely matter by the system, or may not be received at all for a variety of reasons, and it 
is therefore important to understand how controllers would perform with these kinds of 
decision-aiding automated systems, especially when they do not perform perfectly.   
 In Metzger and Parasuraman‘s (2005) study of how controllers performed in a 
free flight situation, they found that in high traffic situation (that is, one that is higher 
than current levels of traffic) where the automation was working perfectly, in a simple 
monitoring task, controllers were only able to identify 62.5% of conflicts without help 
from the system, alerting them to these situations.  With the help of an automated 
decision making aid, controllers were able to identify 70.83% of conflicts, a marked 
improvement.  This experiment also suggests that if the automated system were to 
suddenly fail and controllers had to immediately take manual control of their sector, a 
high percentage (around 30%) of potential LOS would go undetected.   
They went further to test such an environment where the automation was not 
working perfectly, and the results proved to be the opposite.  With no decision-making 
aid from the automation available, controllers were more likely to identify a conflict 
when working manually than when assisted by automation that was failing (Metzger & 
Parasuraman, 2005).   
This work does not address pilot workload, nor does it address situational 
awareness of the controllers in an automated environment.  This experiment shows a 
valid point, that the automation, when imperfect, is a poor substitute for a human 
controller, but the task of controllers simply calling out and identifying LOS between 




Erzberger again addresses the concept of automating the separation assurance for 
air traffic control, and begins to include ADS-B technology as part of the plan, as well as 
an updated procedure list for the TSAFE function (Erzberger, 2009).   
TSAFE, as described in this work, remains a back-up function to the ground-
based system, which would also incorporate information from Mode S transponders from 
appropriately equipped aircraft.  Mode S transponders are currently standardized by 
ICAO already, and provide such functions as automatic reporting of aircraft identity, 
altitude reporting at 25-foot intervals, flight status (airborne or on the ground), and data 
link capabilities.  These capabilities would help TSAFE receive information and send 
information such as flight directives.  The major difference presented here is the new 
timing procedure regarding TSAFE and LOS warnings.   
In this new work, the controller is presented with a warning from TSAFE when an 
aircraft or pair of aircraft was two minutes away from a LOS.  One minute later, if no 
action is taken and the conflict remains unresolved, TSAFE will uplink a conflict 
resolution directly to the aircraft, and then the aircraft would take immediate action to 
avoid the LOS.  TSAFE would maintain control of the aircraft until 60 seconds after the 
LOS is avoided or occurs, and then control would be handed back over to the human 
controller (Erzberger, 2009). 
Erzberger’s work in 2009 goes on to describe a set of “evolutionary steps” 
towards automated separation assurance (Erzberger, 2009).  Here, four levels of 
automation in separation assurance involvement are addressed, moving from automatic 
long range en route conflicts in stage one to automatic sequencing of arrivals in stage two, 
to automatic handling of short range conflicts in stage 3, and finally to the integration of 
short and long range automated separation assurance in the final stage four.  The human 
controller would slowly lose responsibility for separation, and by stage four, the 
controller would only handle specific situations (Erzberger, 2009). 
This work does not address a function or task for human controllers to perform 
which would continue to keep them engaged and in-the-loop.  It is of concern because, 
given system failure or imminent LOS, the controller’s ability to safely assess the 




LOS in a timely manner would be seriously compromised with a low level of situational 
awareness.   
One limitation of the system that was addressed early on was the ability for the 
algorithms to safely provide aircraft with alternative routes for weather avoidance.  
Dangerous weather pops up quickly, and can render a large area of a sector impassable, 
so it is important that the system be able to handle these kinds of deviations in a quick, 
safe manner.   
Erzberger, Lauderdale, and Chu (2010) discuss a unified solution for  difference 
kinds of separation assurance problems which occur en-route, including weather, normal 
separation assurance, and arrival sequencing, stating that it is important for all algorithms 
in the ground-based system to work together, especially in the case of these issues 
occurring simultaneously.  Three different, yet integrated, algorithms are proposed.  The 
proposed version of Autoresolver takes TMA (Traffic Management Advisory) schedules 
and weather cells into account, as well as if the aircraft in an aircraft pair is sequencing 
for arrival or not, and then combines three algorithms to propose one solution to solve 
any combination of issues that arise from the input information (Erzberger et al., 2010).   
These three algorithms; the arrival manager algorithm, the weather avoidance 
algorithm, and resolution generator algorithm, combine with TSAFE, which in this 
research, now manages a 0-3 minute window until LOS (as opposed to the previous 
suggestion of 0-2 minutes), to provide all equipped aircraft in a sector with conflict free 
trajectories, communicated to the aircraft via Data Comm (or data link).   
It is still suggested that the human air traffic controller manage any aircraft that is 
not equipped with Data Comm and other automatic separation technologies (Erzberger et 
al., 2010).  While this system would undoubtedly carry more capacity for the NAS, and 
may have a higher efficiency level than the current system, the failure rate of the system 
is still undefined, and a comprehensive task which keeps controllers actively in the loop, 
as opposed to just monitoring automation or manually managing a very small number of 




These algorithms also do explain their comprehensiveness, or how they can 
account for undefined errors, such as blunders, which have no known probability density 
function by which to statistically predict them. 
Belle, Shortle, and Yousefi (2012) add that it is important to have the ability to 
measure conflict risk in this new automated system.  Here, they use a NAS wide 
simulation to make estimates of conflict rates under the assumption of no conflict 
resolutions.  That is, they are trying to find the rate at which conflicts occur in high traffic 
load sectors when aircraft are on their planned trajectories with no changes.   
The results of the simulation found that, with roughly 35 aircraft/sector/15 
minutes, about 3 LOS occur, and about 0.06 NMAC/sector/15 minutes occur.  These 
rates were found in airway routes, which tend to be larger, structured sections of airspace.  
The simulation was also run on super high airspace sectors to find the conflict rate per 
flight, and the rate of LOS/flight/sector/15 minutes was found to be 0.08 (Belle et al., 
2012).  Algorithms are given which fit the data points, and could be used to estimate the 
rate of LOS, NMAC, etc in the future.   
It is of note that this research is done to simulate a 1.5x traffic sector, where the 
flight count is per 15 minutes, not per minute.  That is, 35 aircraft pass through the sector 
per 15 minutes, not all at once.   
Lauderdale and Erzberger bring up the concern of maintaining separation 
assurance in a highly dynamic environment, such as a sector with active weather 
(Lauderdale & Erzberger, 2014).  Here, a new algorithm is added to previous work done 
by Erzberger (2004) which used geometric calculations to determine routes for aircraft to 
fly tangentially around weather cells in a conflict-free way.  This builds upon Erzberger, 
Lauderdale, and Chu’s (Erzberger et al., 2010) earlier work, and adds a higher 
functionality to the tool, allowing for the development of conflict-free routes around 
multiple, complex cells of weather (Lauderdale & Erzberger, 2014). 
Increasing the robustness of trajectory uncertainty is also discussed, where top-of-
descent vertical buffers and probabilistic conflict detection are introduced.  A top-of-
descent vertical buffer is an additional bubble of space around an aircraft that is 




the aircraft where to decide to start descending earlier than planned.  This would aim to 
clear out the airspace immediately below and in-front of the predicted descent point 
(Erzberger, 2004).   
Probabilistic conflict detection would use knowledge of the past performance to 
predict if two aircraft on certain trajectories have the possibility of colliding trajectories 
(Lauderdale & Erzberger, 2014).  This method of increasing certainty in conflict 
detection, however, does not include blunders, as the PDF of blunders, by nature, cannot 
be defined with a safe level of certainty. 
Overall, most of the research coming from Erzberger, his team, and his associates 
in NASA and academia is centered around a totally automated system, where the 
automation handles most, if not all, separation and traffic management responsibilities, 
and the human controller plays a very limited active role and tends to act more as a 
monitor.  Very little work has been done to address the human factors and safety 
concerns presented by this, nor has much discussion occurred to identify a task for 
controllers.  However, some outside of this team have been working towards a human-
centric solution.  
Landry and Lynam (2011) discuss the ability of pair of aircraft to perform closely 
spaced parallel approaches, where an algorithm to find the “safe zone” around the aircraft 
in respect to wake vortexes is introduced.  The algorithm is a combination simple 
kinematics that calculates the minimum amount of time until a lateral separation between 
a pair of aircraft reaches 500 feet.  These particular equations do not take blunders into 
heavy consideration, but they do account for a blunder where an aircraft makes an offset 
turn and then remains on that reckoning.  That is, the equation does account for a blunder 
that occurs and is not corrected.  These calculations also do not account for changes in 
aircraft speed (Landry & Lynam, 2011).  The idea of the safe zone is similar in concept to 
the top of descent vertical buffer mentioned earlier (Lauderdale & Erzberger, 2014), but 
Landry and Lynam begin to account for blunders not just in altitude or heading changes, 
but at all times during the aircraft pair approach. 
Given that these calculations do account for an uncorrected blunder, it is possible 




seconds, or 60 seconds, this pair of aircraft will not be subject to a LOS, even if they 
were to blunder with a range of 30 degrees, which is considered a worst-case scenario 
blunder (Landry & Lynam, 2011).  This work is not in the regards to automated 
separation, but these kinematic equations play a large role in the development of the 
intensity control measure function, which is the topic of this dissertation. 
Building on the idea of a safe zone and attempting to fill the gap of knowledge as 
to what function controllers would perform in wake of automated separation, the idea of 
the intensity control measure is introduced as a solution for human controllers (Landry, 
2012).   
Here, intensity is defined as the amount of time until, if either aircraft in a pair 
were to blunder, any agent of the system would have 30 seconds or less to detect and 
resolve a LOS (Landry, 2012).  Operationally, this would defer a critical-safety task to 
the human controllers, where they would see a list of “high intensity” aircraft pairs that 
they could choose to either continue to monitor, resolve manually, or ask the automated 
system to suggest a resolution (Landry, 2012).  This is the first mention of an actual task 
for human controllers to perform that would be potentially engaging enough to keep them 
in the loop and capable of safely regaining control of a gracefully failed automated 
system. 
Furthermore, other trains of thought exist where ground-based automation is not 
the only system working to manage air traffic control.  Several different theories have 
been presented that either choose to test the idea of automation as a tool for human 
controllers to leverage, or test the idea of having separation be a shared function between 
automation on the ground and systems in the cockpit with the pilot. 
Morey and Prevot (2013) recognized that having humans interact with automation, 
such as in the proposed automated separation assurance system, would be tricky, as the 
system will naturally be imperfect, and it is likely that the users will all use and interact 
with it differently.  Essentially, system performance by itself does not guarantee success 
in a human-system interaction, as operational situations change, operators and their 
preferences differ, and there tend to always be cases where the automation is totally set 




some changes must be considered for a success automated separation assurance system 
(Morey & Prevôt, 2013).   
In this work, two experiments were done where two different controllers were in 
control of the same sector with the same traffic, and had the same goals (maintaining 
separation in en route sectors and delivering aircraft to the meter fix), although they 
worked separately in different rooms.  Two kinds of error were introduced into the 
aircraft and their trajectories; wind and actual aircraft performance error.  The controllers 
in the experiment had a series of tools at their disposal, a mixture of those currently in use 
and some prototypes.  Of note, they were given access to a tool which allowed the 
controller to query the automated system for a resolution for a delay or advance as well as 
a tool which allowed them to test a conflict or metering resolution and see the expected 
result before a clearance is issued.   
Throughout the experiment, the controllers unanimously agreed that the trial tool 
function which helped provided a conflict free speed for aircraft to get the delay as close 
to zero as possible was the most useful and most stable.  Neither felt the route-trial 
planning tool was particularly useful, although there was some interest in the altitude-
planning tool, which shows conflicts and delay times that would occur based on an 
entered altitude change for an aircraft (Morey & Prevôt, 2013). 
Overall, the controllers all reported that they used the information provided by the 
tools indirectly, meaning that they took the information provided by the automation into 
account, but ultimately made air traffic control decisions on their own.  Controllers also 
tended to use the tools less as errors occurred more often.   
Overall, all controllers had effective strategies for managing the traffic in each 
sector, however, they differed immensely and both used the tools in completely different 
ways.  Even in the face of large errors coming from the trial tools, controllers were able 
to safely manage the aircraft, and seemed to be able to adapt the information or use it 
peripherally instead of directly (Morey & Prevôt, 2013). 
This experiment does not account for any increased levels of traffic, but does 
make an interesting and valid argument for the integration of human control tasks within 




of wind uncertainty and aircraft error or nonconformance, and would present clear danger 
to the NAS if it were the only tool being used to maintain separation.  Morey and Prevot 
(2013) also mention that there are some skills and a level of adaptability that is inherent 
to a human controller which cannot be transferred over to an automated system, therefore 
making the human portion of the ATC control loop a vital one. 
In 2013, the FAA, in conjunction with several technology companies, released the 
results of their own controller-in-the-loop experiment (Harrison, 2013).  This experiment 
was designed to test the impact of Conflict Resolution Advisories (CRA) on the capacity, 
safety, and efficient of air traffic control operations.  This experiment tested the use of 
this tool, which is essentially an automated tool that provides controllers with possible 
solutions for conflict resolution, on both the R-side and the D-side (Harrison, 2013).  The 
R-side can be defined as the “radar man” and is considered a complimentary role to the 
controller who is manually separation aircraft without using radar, sequencing strips, etc.  
The D-side is the controller who is manually separating aircraft, sequencing strips, and 
assisting the R-side with hand-offs and coordination other adjacent sectors.  Although 
this study took place in 2013, the R-side and D-side controllers roles are often mixed 
together and often times one controller performs both roles (Snoddy, 2014).   
Overall, the controllers in the experiment, who controlled an en-route sector, 
found the CRA tool to be useful, but many commented that it wasn’t useful or they 
tended not to pay attention to the tool when their sector became particularly busy.   
Furthermore, the level of workload did not decrease significantly when controllers 
were using the CRA tool versus when they were performing their baseline functions with 
no support from the tool.  There was a slight decrease as the experimental runs continued, 
and this may be attributed to controllers understanding the CRA tool better and perhaps 
trusting it more often, but the decrease in workload was not significant.  Also, most 
controllers in the experiment thought the CRA tool presented too much information at 
once, and most of it was not useful (Harrison, 2013). 
The CRA tool presented the controllers with the wrong altitudes for direction of 
flight several times, and this was when controllers reported they found it the most useless.  




tool and reverted back to baseline, manual tactics to manage the separation.  Overall, the 
number of tactical conflict alerts, that is, conflict alerts with less than 2 minutes to resolve 
them, decreased when controllers were using the CRA tool (Harrison, 2013).   
After the experiment was complete, the controllers were asked a series of 
questions to rate the impact of the automation on the ability to perform their job.  On a 
scale of -5 to 5, -5 meaning the tool had a very negative impact and 5 meaning the tool 
had a very positive impact, controllers responded that with regards to finding a solution 
to a conflict, the automation had an impact level of around 1.22, meaning it had a very 
minor positive impact.  Overall, in the response to these questions, controllers generally 
rated the automation as having a very minor positive impact to their jobs in all aspects, 
with the highest response be 2.61 for the effects of Data Comm (data link) on workload, 
meaning it had a fairly positive effect on reducing workload for them (Harrison, 2013). 
When asked about the number of false alerts and nuisance conflict alerts that the 
automation presented, all controllers found these levels to be unacceptable, and they all 
found the automation to be mildly distracting while working.   
However, they also all reported that they found using the CRA tool somewhat 
improved the accuracy of their work and found the accuracy of the tool itself to be 
somewhat acceptable, rating the accuracy of the too at around 1, where 5 is acceptable 
and -5 is unacceptable.   
Overall, the total effect of the CRA was rated as 1.08 by the controllers, on a scale 
of -5 to 5, where -5 is the CRA hindered their jobs greatly, and 5 means the CRA helped 
their job greatly (Harrison, 2013). 
The overall takeaways and recommendations from the experiment stated that the 
version of CRA tested involved too many clicks for controllers, too many false alerts, too 
many solutions for problems, and presented solutions too far in advance to be useful.  
Controllers also found the display to be distracting, found themselves not scanning their 
sector as rigorously because they were relying on the CRA, and found that sometimes, no 
option was presented for a resolution when it should have been.   
Controllers widely reported that it was simply too many steps to use the CRA tool 




that altitude resolutions to be out of conformance (odd altitudes for aircraft traveling east 
and even altitudes for aircraft traveling west were not a constraint for the CRA tool).  
Also, some solutions presented with very large heading change angles that are unrealistic 
to execute in real life.   
With regards to coordinating between sectors, controllers found that it did not 
present alerts in a timely manner, and that when they were very busy, it was easier to call 
planes on the radio than to go through the process of using the CRA tool (Harrison, 2013).   
Harrison (2013) and Morey and Prevot (2013) are presenting an interesting side in 
the automated separation assurance argument, where automation is simply used as an aid 
rather than a total takeover.  In both experiments, the traffic levels testing only range 
from less than current to just over current (30%-130%), so these solutions may not be 
applicable for traffic levels higher than 1.5x, but both make an interesting point that these 
automated systems have errors and gaps in logic that must be made up for by the human 
controller to be successful.   
A previous study done by Prevot, Homola, Mercer, Mainini, and Cabrall (2009) 
also concluded that while total automation may be needed at some point in the next 20-25 
years, using automation as an aid for conflict resolution to human controllers is a viable 
option in the near future.  They identified shortcomings with short term conflict 
resolutions, citing that work needs to be done to allow for a delay in execution of short-
term conflict resolution maneuvers, as flight crew could take up to 30 seconds to receive 
the direction and execute it.  It is also noted that occasionally these automated aid tools 
suggest maneuvers that are not realistic (Prevot et al., 2009). 
Near-term conflicts are also of interest in this study.  Prevot et al. notes that 
controllers were almost always able to resolve conflicts with almost no notice, and this 
points to the human’s ability to improvise and make fast, sound decisions in a precarious 
situation, but that this human ability should not be totally relied upon.   
It is also noted that it takes human controllers more time to help aircraft regain 
their trajectory-based operations once they’ve been maneuvered off-course to avoid a 
LOS.  Improving the reaction time of the automated system, and strengthening its ability 




moving them back to trajectory based operations in a safe amount of time, is critical to 
making the automated tool more useful or even indispensible in a higher traffic 
environment (Prevot et al., 2009). 
Another heavily discussed theory for air traffic control management to handle 
increasing traffic is to have function allocation between the ground-based system and 
systems inside the cockpit.  Essentially, appropriately equipped aircraft would self-
separated, and then any non-equipped aircraft would be controlled by the ground-based 
system.  Wing et al. (2013) discusses the possibility of this kind of function allocation 
and runs a series of experiments; one to focus on the controller and his roles, and another 
to focus on the pilot and his roles, and his ability to maintain separation and fly the 
aircraft safely. 
 The first experiment Wing et al. conducted was to examine the impact of 
self-separating aircraft on ground-based separation assurance management in different 
level of traffic increase.  The experiment asked two questions: (1) would self-separating 
aircraft impact the controller or ground-based automation’s ability to separate aircraft, 
and (2) would operations work different under different levels of traffic increase (Wing et 
al., 2013).  Two different conditions were tested, one contained only Instrument Flight 
Rated (IFR) operations, and one contained a mixture of IFR and AFR (automated flight 
rules), where AFR refers to aircraft that self-separate.  Another variable of the experiment 
was the level of NextGen being implement.  That is, in the baseline scenario, the 
equipment level and communication abilities mimicked those of the current system.   
In the Minimum NextGen scenario, 25% of simulated aircraft had limited data 
link with the ground system, and a 20% traffic increase was implemented.  In the 
Moderate NextGen stage, 50% of aircraft were data link equipped, traffic volume was 
increased by 50% from baseline, and AFR aircraft had trajectory intent of surrounding 
aircraft (i.e. they were equipped with ADS-B in and out).  In the Maximum NextGen 
scenario, all aircraft were equipped with data link, and automation handled all aspect of 
separation.  This scenario included that maximum level of traffic per sector that is 
expected in next NextGen, which is 35 aircraft per sector (Wing et al., 2013).  This 




Controllers were asked to manage the airspace according to the level of 
automation available in each experimental run, and the results were interesting.  In an 
IFR-only scenario, at baseline conditions, only 1 LOS occurred.  At minimum NextGen, 
3 LOS occurred, at moderate NextGen, 10 LOS occurred, and at maximum NextGen, 0 
LOS occurred.  In the mixed IFR/AFR environment, at baseline, 1 LOS occurred, at 
minimum NextGen, 3 LOS occurred, at moderate NextGen, 5 LOS occurred, and at 
maximum NextGen, 2 LOS occurred.  Approximately half of the LOS events were traced 
back to automation failures that resulted in late conflict detections, and the other half 
were related to operator/automation failures (Wing et al., 2013). 
Controllers felt that their workload was moderate.  When asked to rate their 
workload on a scale of 1 to 6, 6 being very high, in the first three scenarios, the mean 
workload was just over 3, and for the maximum NextGen scenario, the mean workload 
was around 1.8.   
Controllers also found the scenarios generally acceptable, as far as level of risk, 
although in the moderate NextGen scenario, they felt their desired performance was not 
reached and required controller compensation.  This lower rating for the moderate 
NextGen scenario came primarily from two controller subjects who felt that scenario was 
unsafe, reporting that they felt they were put in a position multiple times where they 
could not control the traffic in a safe amount of time (Wing et al., 2013). 
The second experiment was pilot focused, attempting to address the perspective of 
the AFR pilot in mixed operations.  The main focus of the experiment was to identify 
limits under which AFR aircraft can ensure separation from other aircraft, particularly 
unequipped IFR aircraft.  Several variables were tested, such as time to buffer loss (TBL), 
encounter angle, maneuver angle, and passage orientation.   
When the initial alert time to an impending LOS was presented to the pilot 
between 1-10 minutes in the experiment, there was no LOS.  When the alert time came 
between 20-60 seconds, 11 LOS occurred, and when it came less than 20 seconds before, 
there were zero LOS.  With regards to the buffer loss, when the alert time was presented 
at 4-10 minutes, there were zero buffer losses.  At 2-4 minutes, there were 3 buffer losses, 




and at less than 20 seconds, there were 10 buffer losses.  The most dangerous time frame 
for pilots to receive the alert of impending LOS or buffer loss was between 20-60 
seconds.   
It is hypothesized that this amount of time is deceiving, as it seems there might be 
enough time to plan and execute a maneuver.  However, often times, this was not the case.  
In the less than 20 seconds range, pilots seemed aware that they had to take immediate 
action and tended to make decisions with instinct and experience rather than using the 
automation to find a conflict free route, which may have contributed to the lower about of 
LOS and buffer losses in the less than 20 seconds range (Wing et al., 2013).   
Overall, the impact on controller workload and ground-based operations wasn’t 
significant in the first experiment when using IFR/AFR mixed operations, but the high 
level of LOS and buffer losses for pilots being alerted to them within 20-60 seconds is a 
cause for further investigation.  This shows a significant gap in the workload ability for 
pilots to identify a LOS or buffer loss problem, find a solution, and execute the maneuver 
in this time frame.  This gap is a security concern for the ability of mixed operations 
function allocation.  Other than briefly touching on a workload measure, this work does 
not take human factors into account, such as a task to keep controllers engaged. 
This work was further examine in a subjective manner by Burke et al (2013), 
where pilots of a similar experiment to Wing et al. (2013) were asked to rate how their 
perceived their mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand, effort, frustration, 
and performance on a scale of 1 – 11, where 11 is the best possible outcome, in a self-
separating AFR scenario.   
Mental demand was rated at a mean of 5.20, physical demand had a mean of 3.75, 
temporal demand had a mean of 4.86, effort had a mean of 4.25, frustration had a demand 
of 3.33, and performance had a mean of 9.86.  Overall, the pilots were satisfied with their 
performance.  However, it should be noted that this was a simulation environment on a 
desktop computer and pilots were using a mouse to control the simulator.  It is noted that 
results could drastically change if pilots were flying in a full-scale, fully-equipped 




One major concern of automation in air traffic control is the ability to ensure 
pilot/aircraft conformance to directives given by the system, as well as the accuracy and 
ability of the system to perform at a high enough level to ensure a level of safety that 
meets or exceeds the current level of 1x10-8 accidents/flight hour.  Santiago (2013) 
discussed the need for a supplementary tool to the AAC system which checks for aircraft 
that are out-of-conformance, and then provides a safe solution for them to rejoin its 
assigned route or altitude.   
Santiago (2013) defines non-conformance in the vertical domain as an aircraft 
being at a flight level of more or less than 300 ft. than its assigned altitude, climbing 
when the assigned altitude is not above the current one, or descending when the assigned 
altitude is not lower than the current one.  Lateral non-conformance is defined as an 
aircraft who is off its assigned route by more than 7.0 nautical miles, and/or whose angle 
to fix is greater than 30 degrees.   
Flights that are out of conformance pose a serious risk to the automated resolution 
algorithms, as they mostly rely on trajectory based intent.  Therefore, if a flight is veering 
too far off course, the solutions for conflict resolution will be wrong and non-applicable 
to non-conforming flights (Santiago, 2013). 
In order to help bring non-conforming flights back into conformance, Santiago 
suggests an automated function called “recapture,” which is a series of algorithms 
designed to find a conflict-free route for a non-conforming aircraft to rejoin its original 
assigned route.  These algorithms are meant to consider the challenges in doing so by 
focusing on a list of candidate fixes for aircraft to hit on a path to rejoin its original route, 
and the destination fix will never be a candidate fix.  This is done to avoid unrealistic 
maneuvers as well as take other traffic into account to avoid conflicts.   
Santiago performed an experiment where when lateral non-conformance cases 
were detected, the algorithms were able to successfully reroute the aircraft back to its 
original flight path 96% of the time.  It is also noted that the current version of 
Autoresolver that has been tested cannot perform accurately when aircraft are flying 
open-ended vectors or temporary altitudes, and this discovery is crucial because without 




autoresolver, it would be difficult for conflict free recaptures to be successfully planned 
and executed (Santiago, 2013). 
Aside of human-factors driven safety questions, reliability is clearly one of the 
most important components of making the automated system viable for use in any 
capacity in air traffic control and management.  Li and Zhou (2013) propose a safety 
evaluation index utilizing failure records as well as an analytical hierarchy process to 
evaluate how reliable the automated systems are.  Here, the system is evaluated on four 
different levels; humans, management, equipment, and environmental factors.  Each 
factor is subsequently evaluated by a set of more nuanced factors to give it an overall 
“score.”  For example, in the “humans” group, the score is affected by technique and 
manner (which includes professional dedication, professional skill, on the job training, 
safety awareness, and observing discipline), physiological status (which includes fatigue 
and boredom, physical condition, and drug abuse and intemperance), and psychological 
factors (which include work psychology and mental quality).   
Li and Zhou propose that these factors, along with the other 3 factors and their 
breakdown of more nuanced factors, be used to evaluate reliability of automated systems 
for use in air traffic control.  Future work includes the development of a software analysis 
tool for operational condition evaluation of the automated system (Li & Zhou, 2013). 
Furthermore, safety and security of the automated system is another concern.  In 
the current environment of fast technology and extreme availability of computing 
knowledge and power, secure systems are becoming more vulnerable to malware attacks 
or malicious data insertions to disrupt the state of the system.   
Park et al. (2014) acknowledges that security is a major consideration in making 
NextGen upgrades to the air traffic control system, particularly those that would be 
reliant on GPS tracking, data uplinking technologies such as data link, and also any of the 
automated technologies which essentially receive input from the GPS system and the 
flight management systems and run it through millions of lines of code to determine 
routing.   
Some of the major challenges outlined include an adversary inputting a high 




data which would confuse pilots and the AAC system, and also the possibility of 
jamming GPS signals which could make triangulation very difficult (Park et al., 2014).   
Some solutions have been proposed to solve these issues, such as centralized 
localization and distributed localization.  These solutions come with many drawbacks, 
mainly the high cost associated with communication and specialized hardware.   
One solution presented by Park et al. (2014) is the Misbehavior Detection System 
(MDS), whose role is to detect off-nominal aircraft.  Off-nominal aircraft are defined as 
any kind of malicious behavior being executed in the airspace system with the intent of 
exploiting the weaknesses of the satellite-based navigation system.  The MDS would 
protect the interface between aircraft networks, onboard systems, and data services.  It 
would monitor the status on these systems, and provide real-time detection of 
abnormalities or suspected malicious attacks.   
One possible option available for integration utilizes a GPS/INS integrated system 
with a Kalman filter.  The Kalman filter helps to fuse high frequency sensor information 
with low frequency GPS data and estimates the errors in position and speed using the 
difference between the two data readings.   
Another option would use a Doppler/RSS fusion process with a Kalman filter.  To 
find the current position of an aircraft, given an adequate number of neighbors, ADS-B 
positions are received via the Doppler effect and RSS measurements, and the distance is 
calculated using the minimum mean square estimate.  Using this, a modified Kalman 
filter can help find the actual position using system state dynamics.   
Ideally, both methods would run concurrently and would be evaluated side-by-
side.  If there were discrepancies between the two methods, this would identify to the 
system that there was an error, and a potential adversarial situation, and it would be 
flagged for review.  The advantage of this method over previously proposed solutions is 
that it simply uses enhanced functions of systems and technologies that already exist; so 
minimal infrastructure investment would be needed (Park et al., 2014).   
Park et al.’s solution also takes separation assurance into account.  Uncertainty of 
surveillance information is accounted for by using a control algorithm that minimizes 




variable used here is changes in velocity, and minimum separation is taken into account 
via a series of separation minima.   
However, this separation algorithm also takes a predefined minimum probability 
for adversarial events into account.  Under this control algorithm, aircraft would either be 
paired or unpaired.  Paired aircraft would be leading to the same fix, while unpaired 
aircraft would be leading to different fixes.  These geometric constraints are part of the 
control algorithm that would go into minimizing trajectory changes, reducing overall 
flight time, and adding a small buffer in for adversarial events while maintaining 
separation minima (Park et al., 2014). 
Many challenges are recognized for implementation of these methods.  The first 
being that non-cooperative aircraft exist in the airspace, and this will cause delays 
throughout the system that could override the benefits.  Also, if two aircraft are projected 
to reach a fix or merge point at exactly the same time, delays will naturally be incurred 
due to a series decision-making processes, such as determining which aircraft in the pair 
will receive preference (Park et al., 2014). 
A series of simulations are run to test the concept of MDS, along with the control 
algorithm.  In the first basic run, the algorithm was able to successful detect malicious 
aircraft actions, and was also able to detect a sophisticated GPS attack.  The tested 
algorithm was discrete, requiring updates to system operations at discrete time events, but 
future work outlines the development of the algorithm into a continuous state.  It is also 
noted that a serious limitation for consideration is the possibility that implementation of 
this system could cause efficiency reduction in the airspace due to the additional buffers 









Definitions for Analysis Thresholds !
 In order to analyze if the number of aircraft pairs with a critical intensity number 
in a sector is acceptable and safe for human controllers to manage, several threshold 
values must be informally defined.  
 The threshold values are defined by a series of short, informal, semi-structured 
interviews with one retired air traffic controller with 25 years of experience, and a series 
of short, informal interviews with one active air traffic controller with 24 years of 
experience.   
The retired controller, now an FAA representative, was interviewed twice for one 
hour each, along with a series of electronic correspondence.  The first one-hour, in person 
interview was an explanation of the intensity control measure concept, where the retired 
controller was given several pieces of literature to explain the concept, as well as a verbal 
conversation.  The controller was given a questionnaire to fill out, regarding his opinions 
on what a he felt appropriate threshold values would be.  The second one-hour meeting 
was one week later to discuss the questionnaire responses and try to understand the 
controller’s reasoning and theories for his answers.   
The currently active controller was also met for two live interviews in the same 
format.  A third additional meeting took place at the SOCAL TRACON center, his place 
of employment.  This meeting served as a follow up to demonstrate some principals and 
practices that he had explained in the interviews, as well as for data to be collected in a 
very simple, preliminary manner to help establish analysis parameters. 
Follow-up communications with both controllers were established via e-mail in 




served to communicate for the thresholds and parameters chosen for analysis.  
Additionally, these communications helped to confirm controllers felt the chosen 
thresholds were representative of their information and their consultation. 
The first important threshold to consider is what is defined as a critical intensity 
number.  Both controllers felt that, given initial information and based on the 
understanding of the problem, any aircraft pair with an intensity number of 6 or below 
should be considered critical.  Snoddy (2014) concluded that the “idea of intensity 
already works in the minds of most controllers and we usually manage for it anyways, 
even without a real calculation.  My initial reaction is to tell you that if I saw a set of 
planes with this intensity number of five, I would start watching them much more 
seriously, so to add a buffer to that, I would say 6 or 6.5 minutes should be your cut-off.”   
Spillane (2014) also commented that while he has never seen an actual intensity 
calculation in air traffic control previously, he “understands the concept fully,” and feels 
that “this kind of measurement is already taken by most controllers simply in their heads, 
based on previous behaviors and conditions.  For a cut-off, 10 minutes seems too far in 
advance, but five minutes seems to close, because five minutes goes by very quickly 
when flying and controlling traffic.  Six to seven minutes seems like a nice place to start.” 
For the purposes of this research, an intensity control number of 6.0 or below will 
be considered a high intensity aircraft pair (HIP).  Both controllers agreed that 6.0 as a 
threshold is a valid and reasonable threshold to use for this analysis.  Additionally, the 
data will be analyzed with HIP definition at 1.0 and 2.5 to increase the understanding of 
the intensity measure.  HIP defined as 1.0 or below is chosen because both Snoddy and 
Spillane commented that 1.0 instinctively feels like the lowest possible HIP definition 
possible to use without compromising safety, and a HIP definition of 2.5 or below is 
chosen because it was identified by Snoddy as another possible option (Snoddy, 2014; 
Spillane, 2014). 
Next, it is important to determine what percentage of these critical aircraft pairs 
would likely require the controller to apply some kind of action or intervention, a safe 
intervention percentage.  That is, what percentage of these highly intense aircraft pairs 




Snoddy (2014) commented that unless a direct conflict alert is given, he feels that 
he intervenes to help avoid the chance of a conflict for 5 out of 10 aircraft.  However, he 
also feels that, without managing normal separation, as in an automated environment, the 
algorithms and system would be doing so, he feels more attention would go towards 
avoiding possible future problems brought on by blunders.  In this case, he feels it would 
be more likely that controllers would intervene for up to 7 out of 10 aircraft in their sector 
at a given point in time. 
Spillane mentioned that this measure “is subjective and depends heavily on the 
controller, the airspace, the terrain, and the weather.”  He goes on to explain that “most 
controllers tend to be more risk-prone and may only feel they need to do something for 
40% of the aircraft pairs.  But, some controllers are very risk-adverse, so they may add 
control to over 70% of the pairs.”  He also mentions that as controllers become more 
comfortable with the understanding of the intensity number, this percentage will continue 
to fluctuate (Spillane, 2014). 
Given Spillane’s concerns about the variability in safe percentage intervention, 
analysis is run to consider the amount of aircraft pairs with high intensity that will require 
intervention at 1% through 100% at intervals of 1%.  This analysis will serve to find if a 
threshold exists where above a certain percentage, the intensity control measure would 
present too high a workload for controllers, or if below a certain percentage, the 
controller would revert to simply monitoring the task and would not be engaged enough 
for appropriate situational awareness.   
Finally, both controllers agree that 18 aircraft pairs needing human intervention or 
control would be the upper limit for the amount of aircraft pairs the a human controller 
could handle at once.  Therefore, anything situation resulting in 19 or more critically 




  Four levels of traffic and their associated intensity numbers are evaluated.  These 




suggested by the original NextGen technology proposal that all implementable systems 
be able to handle.   
 
The data points to compute intensity are taken from an open-loop data run in X-
Plane, where real NAS traffic data is used to build a simulation of aircraft flight paths in 
the Cleveland Center area, shown in Figure 5.  The black star represents where Cleveland 
Center is located, and the red pins represent simulated flights in the area that were used 
for analysis.  Aircraft position, speed, heading, and altitude are recorded once per second 
over the time period the aircraft is within Cleveland Center.  This simulated traffic data 
contains flight information of 162 aircraft.  In order to reach the desired traffic levels for 
each minute of analysis, 78 sets of aircraft data were utilized.  One data point per minute 
is used for each aircraft. For this research, analysis is done on en-route, or cruising 
sectors of traffic.  That is, data comes from Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC), 
and no evaluation is done on arrival, departure or TRACON traffic.  Cruising traffic is 
defined as an aircraft flying at flight level 24,000 ft. or above.  Any aircraft below 24,000 
ft. at any given minute was eliminated from analysis. 




As previously stated, the amount of aircraft that a controller can handle is around 
12-18 aircraft.  For this analysis, a sector is assumed to have a maximum of 12 aircraft 
while being fully handled by a human controller.  At current levels of traffic, while 
evaluating intensity, controllers are handling around 72 distinct aircraft pairs at once, as 
the number of distinct aircraft pairs is defined as n2/2 (Shortle & Zhang, 2014), where n is 
the number of aircraft per sector. At a 1.5x traffic level with a maximum of 18 aircraft 
per sector, there are 162 aircraft pairs, at 2x traffic level with a maximum of 24 aircraft, 
there are 288 distinct aircraft pairs, and at a 3x traffic level with a maximum of 36 aircraft 
in a sector, there are 648 distinct aircraft pairs (Figure 6). 
 !





Data Manipulation !! The raw data presented from X-Plane is not in the appropriate units of 
measurement for the intensity calculation.  Therefore, data manipulation was required.  
 First, the velocity of the aircraft is presented as Mach.  It is necessary for velocity 
to be in feet per second, so this measurement was converted by multiplying Mach by 
1115.4856 to achieve feet per second.   
Secondly, the location of the aircraft is given in longitude and latitude.  The 
intensity calculation requires the aircraft position be given in respect to x and y, in feet.  
Longitude (which corresponds to X) and latitude (which corresponds to Y) are given in 
terms of meridians, both of which there are 360 of around the Earth.  The earth’s 
circumference is 21,640.6 nautical miles, and given the assumption that the Earth is a 
fairly perfect 360-degree circle, 1 degree (or meridian) will equal an arc of roughly 60 
nautical miles (21,640.6 nm / 360  = 60.113 nm).  Given this, each longitude and latitude 
data point is multiplied by 60 to find nautical miles for X and Y.   
Additionally, the minimum of each X and Y point in each data set is taken to 
normalize the position points.  This was done due to ensure that all location data points 
where positive, as the longitude around Cleveland Center is around -80 degrees.  The 
final calculation was to go from nautical miles to feet,  so the number was multiplied by 
6076.12, as there are 6076.12 feet per nautical mile. The manipulations done for each 
data set’s location points are shown in Table 1. 
 





All aircraft pairs have their intensity numbers calculated once per minute while in 
transit through the given sector.  Evaluations of intensity numbers and the amount of 
critical pairs will be evaluated once a minute for forty minutes for each experimental run.    
While evaluating air traffic at the SOCAL TRACON for two hours, it was observed that 
no aircraft stayed within the sector for longer than 38 minutes or for less than 1.5 minutes.  
While TRACON airspace is highly trafficked, both Spillane and Snoddy confirmed that 
en-route traffic also follows this pattern.  Therefore, the intensity number will be 
evaluated in the time frame of 1 to 40 minutes. 
The blunder heading change (!) will be evaluated as an array featuring heading 
changes of [-90°, -45°, 0°, 15°, 30°, 45°, 90°].  This range, essentially saying that the 
aircraft blunder would be anything ranging from a sharp left turn to a sharp right turn, is 
within the limits of the aircraft in the 30-second window.  As the standard rate of turn for 
an aircraft is 180°/minute, any heading change beyond 90° in either direction from the 
aircraft’s dead reckoning is considered unfeasible within 30 seconds.  Additionally, as 
this analysis is dealing with en-route sectors where aircraft would be at cruising altitudes, 
most which are well over 30,000 feet, any turn faster than 180°/minute would most likely 
result in an engine stall, and is therefore high unlikely.  Similarly, the blunder heading 
change rate (!), is defined as 180°/minute.  The analysis factors are shown below in 
Table 1. 
The aircraft pair data will put into the intensity formula, and given the aircraft pair 
current position, velocity, heading, and altitude, an intensity number will be generated for 
each aircraft pair.  Additionally, the current lateral distance between each aircraft pair is 








Table&2:&Matrix&for&Analysis&!! = −!",−!",!,!",!",!",!" ,! = !"#!"# ,!"# = !.!,!.!,!.!!
 Sector 1 Sectors 1 Sectors 1 Sectors 1 
t=1     
t=2     
t=3     
⌥     
t=40     
 Current Traffic 1.5x Traffic 2x Traffic 3x Traffic 
 
Because the intensity calculation is run where the blunder heading change is an 
array, the intensity numbers for each aircraft pair at a given time is an array.  Therefore, 
the intensity number of an aircraft pair can be determined in two ways; first, the lowest 
intensity number, or minimum, from the array is pulled for display.  This shows the most 
critical scenario that could occur.  Second, the central tendency of all the intensity 
numbers in the array is calculated and displayed alongside the minimum.  In this research, 
the central tendency number is displayed, but only the minimum intensity number from 
the array is used for analysis. 
The addition, the central tendency value helps to establish a more holistic view of 
the intensity situation for each aircraft pair, and is aimed to help manage pairs more 
efficiently.  For example, an aircraft pair may exist where the minimum intensity number 
is 4, which is considered critical.  However, the central tendency from the array may be 
11.  An aircraft pair will be flagged as critical if either the central tendency or the average 
intensity number is 6 or below, but the large difference between the minimum and the 
central tendency signals to the controller that perhaps this pair is not as critical or 
dangerous as an aircraft pair with a minimum of 5 and an central tendency of 6.5.  
The central tendency of each array is chosen for analysis, as opposed to the mean 
or average, because there is no guarantee that the array of intensity numbers is normal.  




The lateral distance and vertical distance between each pair is also calculated in 
order to eliminate any pair from being counted as a “high intensity” pair that would 
already be picked up as a separation assurance problem by automation.  Therefore, if any 
aircraft pair displays a lateral distance of 18,228.36 ft. (3 nautical miles, the lowest 
standard for routine separation), it is not counted as “high intensity.”  Furthermore, if the 
aircraft are more than 1700 ft. apart vertically, it is not counted as high intensity.  The 
minimum required vertical separation is 1000 ft. between aircraft, and the additional 700 
ft. adds a buffer zone for additional safety. 
An aircraft pair will be determined “high intensity” if it satisfies all of the 
following conditions. 
1. The intensity number is less than the High Intensity Pair definition (1,0, 2.5, 
or 6) 
2. The lateral distance is greater than 18,228.36 ft. 
3. The vertical distance is less than 1700 ft. 
 
Once the minimum intensity number is established at a given time=t by 
mathematical analysis, the intensity numbers are recorded and then recalculated and 
recorded for the time t=t+1 until t=40.  Then, the number of high intensity aircraft pairs is 
recorded, and the number of pairs that would require controller intervention or assistance 
(c) from 1% - 100% is calculated.  The percentage threshold at which more than 18 
aircraft pairs would require controller intervention or assistance is also noted. 
The number of HIP is evaluated to determined if human controllers are able to 
safely manage the number of high-intensity aircraft pairs at different traffic levels, or if a 
threshold exists where, above a certain traffic level, the intensity control measurement 
presents too many high-intensity pairs for management and renders the system unsafe.  
The upper threshold of aircraft a controller can handle in the current environment is 
around 18 (Wing et al., 2013), so 18 critical intensity aircraft pairs which require 





To address the variability and potential uncertainty around the percentage of 
aircraft pairs that would require intervention (Spillane, 2014), analysis is done at 1% 
through 100%  It is possible that, at any given time, the percentage of aircraft pairs which 
require intervention would change as time changed (Spillane, 2014), and it is important to 
validate the safety of the system, if, for example, all aircraft pairs required intervention at 
a given time t, or if some kind of limit exists, where above some X percentage, the 
system becomes unsafe because the number of pairs a controller can safely handle is 
exceeded. 
The percentage of “high” intensity aircraft pairs that require intervention does not 
affect the actual calculation of intensity itself; but is rather a way to measure the 
acceptability of the measure for controllers.  Similarly, the definition of HIP (1.0, 2.5, or 
6.0), which is the threshold for what is considered a “high” intensity aircraft pair, does 
not affect the calculation itself.  Both of these numbers simply serve as a moveable 


















Traffic Level: Current !
Given current traffic levels (n≤12), over a time period of 40 minutes, and 
evaluated under the definition of High Intensity at 1.0, 2.5, and 6.0, the amount of High 
Intensity aircraft pairs (HIP) is always below 18.  Therefore, the human controller would 
always be able to safely apply control to 100% of the HIP at any time.  At current traffic 
levels, intensity is a task that controllers can safely manage. 
 When HIP is defined as a pair with an intensity number of below 1.0, the 
minimum number of HIP at any time is 2 and the maximum of HIP at any time is 7.  
Therefore, it is safe for human controllers to apply control to 100% of the HIP, 100% of 
the time (Figure 7).  The number of HIP pairs never reaches 18 in one minute  !
!
Figure 7: High Intensity Aircraft Pairs < 1.0, 1x Traffic 
 












When HIP is defined as a pair with an intensity number below 2.5, the minimum 
number of HIP at any time is 2 and the maximum of HIP at any time is 10.  Therefore, it 
is safe for controllers to apply control to 100% of HIP 100% of the time (Figure 8).  The 
number of HIP never reaches the threshold of 18 in one minute. !
!
Figure 8: High Intensity Aircraft Pairs < 2.5, 1x Traffic 
 
 When HIP is defined as a pair with an intensity number of 6 or below, the 
minimum number of HIP at any time is 3 and the maximum number of HIP at any time is 
10.  Therefore, it is safe for a human controller to apply control to 100% of HIP 100% of 
the time (Figure 9).  The number of HIP under this definition never reaches the threshold 




















Figure 9: High Intensity Aircraft Pairs < 6.0, 1x Traffic 
 
 
Traffic Level: 1.5x !
Under 1.5x traffic conditions (n≤18), over a time period of 40 minutes and 
evaluated at HIP definitions of 1.0, 2.5, and 6.0, the amount of HIP is not always below 
18.  Therefore, the human controller cannot always apply control to every HIP in the 
sector.  At the increased traffic level of 1.5x current, intensity has varying levels of 
manageability. 
 When HIP is defined as a pair with an intensity number of 1.0 or below, the 
minimum number of HIP at any time is 4 and the maximum number of HIP at any given 
time is 28.  During the 40-minute period of analysis, the number of HIP exceeds the 
safety threshold of 18 pairs 12 times (Figure 10). 
 Under this definition, at a 1.5x traffic level, it is only safe to intervene with 100% 
of HIP 66% of the time.      It is safe to intervene with 60% of HIP 100% of the time. 













Figure 10: High Intensity Aircraft Pairs < 1.0, 1.5x Traffic 
 
 
 When HIP is defined as a pair with an intensity number of 2.5 or below, the 
minimum number of HIP at any time is 9 and the maximum number of HIP at any time is 
39.  During the 40 minute time period of analysis, the number of HIP in a minute exceeds 
the safety threshold of 18 pairs 31 times (Figure 11). 
Under this definition at 1.5x, human controllers can safely apply control to 100% 
of HIP only 22.5% of the time.  At 60% of HIP intervention, 77.5% of HIP can safely 
have control applied by human controllers.  It is always safe to intervene with 46% of 
HIP at any time. 
 When HIP is defined as a pair with an intensity number of 6.0 or below, the 
minimum number of HIP at any time is 11 and the maximum number of HIP at any time 
is 41.  During the 40 minute time period of analysis, the number of HIP in a minute 
exceeds the safety threshold of 18 pairs 36 times (Figure 12). 
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HIP < 1.0 (19 and above) 






Figure 11: High Intensity Aircraft Pairs < 2.5, 1.5x Traffic 
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HIP < 2.5 (beyond 18) 




















































HIP < 6.0 (19 and above) 




Under this definition at 1.5x, human controllers can safely apply control to 100% 
of HIP only 22.5% of the time.  At 60% of HIP intervention, 77.5% of HIP can safely 
have control applied by human controllers.  It is always safe to intervene with 46% of 
HIP at any time. 
 When HIP is defined as a pair with an intensity number of 6.0 or below, the 
minimum number of HIP at any time is 11 and the maximum number of HIP at any time 
is 41.  During the 40 minute time period of analysis, the number of HIP in a minute 
exceeds the safety threshold of 18 pairs 36 times (Figure 12). 
 Under this definition at 1.5x traffic, human controllers can safely apply control to 
100% of HIP 10% of the time.  At 60% of HIP intervention, 60% of HIP can safely have 
control applied to them by human controllers.  It is always safe to intervene with 43% of 
HIP at any time. 
 
 
Traffic Level: 2x !
Under 2x traffic conditions (n≤24), over a time period of 40 minutes and 
evaluated at HIP definitions of 1.0, 2.5, and 6.0, the amount of HIP is not always below 
18.  Therefore, the human controller cannot always apply control to every HIP in the 
sector.  At the increased traffic level of 2x current, intensity has varying levels of 
manageability. 
 When HIP is defined as a pair having intensity of 1.0 or below, the minimum 
number of HIP at any given time is 15 and the maximum number of HIP at any given 
time is 44.  During the 40 minute time period of analysis, the number of HIP exceeds the 
safety threshold of 18 pairs 38 times (Figure 13). 
 Under this definition of HIP at 2x traffic, it is safe for human controllers to apply 
control to every HIP only 5% of the time.  At an intervention rate of 60%, it is safe for 






Figure 13: High Intensity Aircraft Pairs < 1.0, 2x Traffic 
  
 When HIP is defined as a pair having an intensity number of 2.5 or below, the 
minimum number of HIP at any given time is 25 and the maximum number of HIP at any 
given time is 65.  During the 40 minute time period of analysis, the number of HIP 
exceeds the safety threshold of 18 pairs per minute 40 times (Figure 14). 
Under this definition of HIP at 2x traffic level, it is never safe for human controls 
to apply control to every HIP.  At a 60% intervention rate, it is only safe for controllers to 
apply control 5% of the time.  It is always safe for controllers to intervene with 27% of 
HIP. 
 When HIP is defined as a pair with an intensity number of 6.0 or less, the 
minimum number of HIP at any given time is 34 and the maximum number of HIP at any 
given time is 73.  During the 40 minute time period of analysis, the safety threshold of 18 
pairs per minute is always exceeded (Figure 15). 
Under this definition of HIP at 2x traffic level, it is never safe for humans to apply 
control to every HIP.  At a 60% intervention rate, it is never safe for controllers to apply 
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Figure 14: High Intensity Aircraft Pairs < 2.5, 2x Traffic 
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Figure 15: High Intensity Aircraft Pairs < 6.0, 2x Traffic 
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Traffic Level: 3x 
 
 Under 3x traffic conditions (n≤36), over a time period of 40 minutes and 
evaluated at HIP definitions of 1.0, 2.5, and 6.0, the amount of HIP is not always below 
18.  Therefore, the human controller cannot always apply control to every HIP in the 
sector.  At the increased traffic level of 2x current, intensity has varying levels of 
manageability. 
When HIP is defined as a pair with an intensity number of 1.0 or less, the 
minimum number of HIP at any time is 29 and the maximum number of HIP at any time 
is 105.  During the 40 minute time period of analysis, the number of HIP always exceeds 





 Under this definition of HIP at a 3x traffic level, it is never safe for controls to 
always apply control to every HIP.  It is safe for controllers to intervene with 60% of HIP 
only 5% of the time.  It is always safe for controllers to apply control to 18% of HIP. 
 When HIP is defined as a pair with an intensity number of 2.5 or below, the 
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is 130.  The amount of HIP per minute always exceeds the safety threshold of 18 pairs 





 Under this definition of HIP at 3x traffic, it is never safe for controllers to apply 
control to every HIP.  It is never safe for controllers to apply control to 60% of HIP.  It is 
always safe for controllers to apply control to 13% of HIP. 
 When HIP is defined as a pair with an intensity number of 6.0 or below, the 
minimum number of HIP at any time is 51 and the maximum number of HIP at any given 
time is 142.  The number of HIP per minute always exceeds the safety threshold of 18 
pairs per minute (Figure 18). 
 Under this definition of HIP at 3x traffic, it is never safe for controllers to apply 
control to every HIP.  It is never safe for controllers to apply control to 60% of HIP.  It is 
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Figure 18: High Intensity Aircraft Pairs < 6.0, 3x Traffic 
 
Safe Intervention Level !! Safe intervention level is defined as the percentage of all aircraft pairs in any 
given minute that contains 18 or less HIP.  That is, if the safe intervention level is 42%, 
then 18 HIP pairs are 42% of the overall number of HIP in that time period. 
The safe intervention level in each minute is shown to be normally distributed 
across the 4 traffic levels, but variance is high within each traffic level.  Therefore, while 
it is clear that the safe intervention level decreases as the traffic level increases (Figure 
19), the best-fit line of the combined data is poor, and no predictive model can be drawn 
from this data (Figure 20).   
However, 95% confidence intervals found using a nonparametric 1-sample sign 
test show that at 1.5x traffic, it is 95% probable that the percentage of safe intervention 
will be between 69.00% and 81.81%.  For 2x traffic, it is 95% probable that the 
percentage of safe intervention will be between 40% and 45%.  For 3x traffic, it is 95% 
probable that the safe intervention level will be between 19% and 22% (Appendix B).  
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Figure 19: Safe Percentage of Intervention by Traffic Level !
!
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At traffic levels 1.5x and 2x, it is possible to reach a safe intervention level of 
100%, but at 3x, under these conditions, it does not appear possible to reach a safe 
intervention level of 100%.!!!It!is!necessary!to!use!nonparametric!methods!to!find!confidence!intervals!in!this! analysis! because! the! data! violates! the! assumptions! of! traditional! statistics.!!Since!the!data!is!not!normal!(Appendix!B)!and!there!is!nonPconstant!variance,!both!of! which! are! assumptions! of! ANOVA,! tPtests,! and! regression! analysis,! utilizing!nonparametric!measures!is!best.! !Nonparametric!tests!do!not!assume!normality!or!constant!variance.!!The!nonparametric!test!used!here!in!Minitab!uses!a!onePsample!test!sign,!which!also!does!not!assume!symmetry.!!This!method!does!have!limitations,!as!it!tends!to!be!less!powerful!than!a!tPtest!with!normality!and!it!tests!the!population!around! the! median! instead! of! the! mean.! ! The! test! itself! performs! analysis! and!provides!a!pPvalue!based!on!a!binomial!distribution.!
 
 
Number of HIP per minute 
 
 The analysis of data shows that the number of HIP per minute increases as 
traffic levels increase (Figure 21).    It appears that the relationship between traffic level 
and the number of HIP/minute is non-linear, and best-fit lines for each data set given by 
HIP definition reveals a power relationship.  That is, the number of HIP/minute increases 
by a power of about 2.5 as the traffic level increases.   However, the fitted line plot of the 
combined data (Figure 22) shows that the predictive model is poor, as most data points is 
poorly fit to the line. Additionally, the data proves to be non-normal with non-constant 





Figure 21: HIP per minute by Traffic Level !!
!
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Due to the non-normality of data (Appendix B), it is necessary to use 
nonparametric analysis to find confidence intervals for the number of HIP/minute based 
on traffic level.  At 1.0x/current traffic level, it is 95% probable that the number of 
HIP/minute will fall between 5 and 6.  At 1.5x traffic level, it is 95% probable that the 
number of HIP/minute will fall between 21 and 26.  At 2x traffic level, it is 95% probable 
that the number of HIP/minute will fall between 40 and 45.  At 3x traffic level, it is 95% 
probably that the number of HIP/minute will fall between 79 and 91 (Appendix B). 
 
Number of HIP per minute and Number of Aircraft (n) per minute !!! Further analysis of the data shows the number of HIP per minute increases when 
the number of aircraft (n) in that minute increases.  The relationship between the number 
of HIP per minute and n appears to be linear or potentially a quadratic polynomial from 
the scatterplot (Figure 23). 
!
Figure&23:&Number&of&HIP/minute&by&n/minute&!
Linear regression analysis reveals the number of HIP/minute by n/minute to have 
















HIP/min by n/minute 




variance (Figure 24).  Therefore, the regression model is not predictive to determine how 
many HIP/per would occur when a sector were to have n aircraft present. 
!




CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS !!!
Discussion !!!
HIP Percentage Intervention + Traffic Levels !! ! The analysis of high intensity aircraft pairs in an area with a variety of 
traffic levels yielded several unexpected insights into the development of the intensity 
measure.   
First, it appears that this would be an implementable task for controllers in the 
current 1x traffic level environment from a workload perspective.  The amount of HIP 
never exceeds the workload limit of 18 per minute over the course of 40 minutes, 
regardless of the definition of HIP (1,0, 2.5 or 6.0).  Controllers would be able to apply 
control to 100% of HIP at all times.  Due to the static nature of the analysis, it is 
unknown how applying control would affect the amount of HIP per minute. 
For 1.5x traffic levels, results vary greatly by the definition of HIP.  When HIP is 
defined as any aircraft pair with an intensity number of 1.0 or less, the number of HIP 
exceeds 18 in 12 different minutes.  It is worth noting that these times where the number 
of HIP exceeds controller workload capability happen in clusters.  It may be possible that 
when control is applied in a dynamic environment, these overly loaded minutes would 
resolve by the actions of the controller and the subsequent minutes would then no longer 
be unsafe for controllers to manage.  In the current static analysis though, the controllers 
could safely intervene with 64% of HIP at all times. 
When HIP is defined as 2.5 or less at 1.5x traffic, the results begin to shift 




different minutes.  It would be safe for controllers to intervene with only 46% of HIP at 
any given minute.  Again, the application of dynamic control may resolve many of these 
HIP.  While the aircraft are moving in this static analysis, once a HIP appears, it seems to 
remain a HIP for some time.  Some HIP seem to eventually resolve themselves over time, 
but dynamically applied control may decrease the amount of time that an aircraft pair is a 
problem for controllers. 
When the definition of HIP is moved down to 6.0 at 1.5x traffic, results continue 
to deteriorate.  Here, it is safe for controllers to apply control to just 43% of HIP at any 
time.  The number of minutes that the number of HIP exceeds 18 is now 36 minutes.  
There is not a drastic difference between the percentages of controllable HIP at the 
definitions being 2.5(46%) and 6 (43%), in contrast with the difference between 
1.0(64%) and 2.5(46%).  This suggests that a large proportion of HIP have intensity 
numbers ranging between 1 and 2.5, and that only a small number reside in the 2.6 to 6.0 
ranges.   
When the traffic level increases to 2x, similar results are shown.  When HIP is 
defined as 1 or below, controllers can safely apply control to 40% of HIP at any time.  
When HIP is defined as 2.5, that percentage drops largely to 27%, and when HIP is 
defined as 6.0, the percentage only drops to 24%.  These results continue to suggest that 
the amount of aircraft pairs with an intensity number between 2.6 and 6.0 is very small. 
At 3x traffic levels, the results further suggest this trend.  When HIP is defined as 
1.0 or less, the percentage of HIP that controllers can apply intervention towards at all 
times is only 17%.  When HIP is defined as 2.5 or less, that percentage drops to 13%, and 
when HIP is 6.0 or less, that percentage is only 12%.   
This evidence suggests that the difference between defining HIP as 2.5 and 6.0 or 
below may be negligible, and that the majority of HIP have intensity numbers between 0 
and 2.5.    
Statistical analysis shows that there is very little relationship between the 
percentages of HIP that are always safe to intervene with and the definition of HIP.  A 
linear regression analysis, chosen because scatterplot data did not reveal any evidence of 




the data provides a standard error of S=34.6031, a p-value of 0.658, and an R-Squared 
value of 0% (Figure 30).  Therefore, there is no statistically significant relationship 




Number of HIP/minute and Traffic Level 
 
The number of HIP/minute increases as the traffic level increases, as expected.  
However, analysis of the relationship between the number of HIP/minute increases by a 
power of 2.5 as the traffic level increases.  Regression analysis reveals no well-fit model 
for the data (Appendix B), but many interesting observations are drawn from the analysis 




High, Non-Constant Variance !! The mean of the response variable, the number of HIP/minute, with respect to 
traffic levels, has a non-constant level of variance that increases dramatically as the 
traffic level increases.  Descriptive statistics of HIP/minute with respect to traffic level is 
shown below.   !
Variable    Traffic    N  N*    Mean  SE Mean  StDev  Variance        
HIP/minute  1.0      120   0   5.225    0.188  2.060     4.243     
            1.5      120   0  23.317    0.784  8.592    73.815     
            2.0      120   0   42.52     1.10  12.02    144.54     
            3.0      120   0   84.84     2.39  26.15    683.98    !!
 
The level of variance increases by a power of roughly 4.4 as the traffic level increases.  
The number of n increasing in each traffic level, and therefore the number of unique pairs 
increasing can explain the dramatic increase in variance.  The number of pairs increases 
by the function of n2/2, so as n increases from a maximum of 24 aircraft at 2x, where the 




number of unique aircraft pairs is 648.  This is a 225% increase in the number of unique 
aircraft pairs.  This increase drives a significantly higher number of pairs which are 
eligible to be labeled as HIP.  Additionally, the increased number of aircraft in the same 
amount of space will naturally lead to more HIP. 
Another source of the high levels of non-constant variance are the ranges of n in 
each analysis.  The minimum and maximum of aircraft being evaluated in each traffic 
level analysis is shown in table 3. 
 
Table 3: Aircraft n and unique pair min/max by traffic level 
 Minimum n Minimum 
unique pairs 
Maximum n Maximum 
unique pairs 
Current Level 10 50 12 72 
1.5x 12 72 18 162 
2x 17 145 24 288 
3x 21 221 36 648 
 
The number of unique pairs for analysis only increases by 44% from minimum to 
maximum n at the current traffic level.  At 1.5x,  the number of unique pairs increases by 
55.5%, and at 2x, it increases by 49.6% from minimum to maximum n.  However, at 3x, 
the number of unique pairs for analysis increases by 65.8% from minimum to maximum 
n.  These increases account for the reason the variance is much higher at 3x than it is at 
current, 1.5x and 2x.   
The large range of n at 3x is indicative of the reality of what this kind of traffic 
increase may look like.  It is entirely possible that at any given minute, there may be only 
21 or 22 aircraft in the sector, but five or six minutes later, there may be 32 aircraft in the 
sector, or even 36 aircraft.  This jump is large, causing the number of unique pairs for 
analysis to skyrocket, but it is feasible. 
Additionally, the relationship between the difference of maximum and minimum 
pairs at a traffic level and its corresponding variance display a quadratic relationship.  




variance also increases (Appendix B).  The cause of the relationship is unknown but 
should be examined. 
It is necessary to weight the non-linear regression of HIP/minute and traffic level 
in order to manage the non-constant variance.  Weighting the data with 1/(# of 
HIP/minute) for each data point is chosen because while the wide range of n is causing 
the non-constant variance, it is actually the high, non-constant variance of the number of 
HIP/minute that is causing the problem in the regression.  Therefore, weighting the 
analysis with the inverse of HIP/minute helps to cancel out the heavy effect of the larger 
HIP/minute data points.  
Weighting the non-linear regression analysis does cause the standard error of the 
model to decrease drastically, but the model is still poorly fit to the data.  Additionally, 
the data for HIP/minute at 1.5x, 2x, and 3x are not normal, and therefore regression 




HIP/minute by N/minute !
 The number of HIP/minute by the number of aircraft (n)/minute provides an 
interesting level of granularity by which it is possible to further analyze the source of the 
data’s non-constant variance.  The relationship between the number of HIP/minute and 
the number of aircraft (n) present in the sector at that time are is linear or potentially 
quadratic, however, non-constant variance and non-normality of the data yield the 
original regression model inappropriate due to regression assumption violation.   
 Despite the regression assumptions being violated, it is more valid to notice that 
the regression equation does not fit the data points very well.  This shows that the model 
itself is not very predictive.   
 It is possible to perform a Box-Cox Transformation on the response (the number 
of HIP/minute).  Box-Cox Transformations, also known as power transformations, are 
used to stabilize variance in order to improve the validity of statistical analysis such as 
regression, and also improves normality in many cases.  A Box-Cox transformation is 




Minitab (Appendix B).  This transformation does improve the variance of HIP/minute, 
making it more constant, and the normality appears to improve as well.  However, the fit 
of the data points to the line does not improve, and despite the transformative measures, 
the line continues to be non-predictive.  The transformation does not solve the problem of 
non-constant variance and non-normality, but rather covers it up.   
 The descriptive statistics however do show areas of interest.  At varying levels of 
n, the variance in the number of HIP/minute is non-constant.  However, some levels of n 
experience much higher variance than others (Appendix B).  For example, when n=20, 
the variance is 212.28, but when n=18, the variance is only 71.52.  There appears to be 
some interesting properties of the aircraft traffic when n=20, and further investigation of 
what is causing such high variance at n=20 may yield important insights into how the 
measure of intensity behaves with live traffic.  Particular aircraft numbers (n) of note are 
n=15, 19, 20, 23, 24, 26, 29, 33, 36.  These levels of n all have variances that behave 
different than those around them (Appendix B). 
 Since the regression analysis is not valid in predicting how many HIP/minute will 
occur at varying levels of n, it is useful to use quartiles.  When n=20, the minimum is 20, 
the first quartile is 33, the median is 40, the third quartile is 48, and the maximum is 73. 
That means the highest 25% of the number of HIP/minute when n=20 falls between 48 
and 73.  The highest 50% of the number of HIP/minute when n=20 falls between 40 and 
73, and the highest 75% of the number of HIP/minute when n=20 falls between 33 and 73.  
These quartiles are more predictive in helping to determine how many HIP/minute to 




Intensity Model Variables 
 
 The definition of intensity states that the number itself refers to the amount of 
time until, if either aircraft in a pair blunders, the agents of the system would have 30 
seconds or less to detect and resolve a NMAC.  However, the “30 seconds or less” 
portion of that definition is malleable and changing that time frame may result in a 




It is interesting to note that at current, 1.5x, and 2x, it is possible to reach a point 
where the number of HIP is 18 or below.  At 3x, however, this does not occur.  For 
example, at 2x, when HIP is defined as 1.0 or below, 18 or fewer HIP occur in two 
separate minutes.  These two instances may reveal some interesting properties about the 
kind of traffic that yields less HIP pairs, which in turn may help determine a more 
appropriate time frame for the definition of intensity. 
Additionally, it is possible that, given the 30-second threshold, a large number of 
HIP exist at 31 or 32 seconds.  These HIP existing at 31 seconds would most likely be 
just as intense and potentially dangerous as those within the 30-second limit, but they 
would be excluded.  Therefore, computing intensity with a range of time, such as from 30 
to 40 seconds, as the threshold, may yield a safer and more appropriate measure to be 





 Many limitations exist in this research surrounding the development of the 
intensity control measure.  A formal threshold for what is considered to be a critical 
intensity number has not yet been established.   Further experimentation using human air 
traffic controller subjects is necessary to formally establish this threshold, utilizing both 
performance data and subjective interviews.  Once candidate threshold numbers are 
established, the methodology used here can be applied to additional sets of data for 
reanalysis using the adjusted threshold for what is considered a high-intensity number for 
an aircraft pair.  This may affect the number of HIP that occur per minute, and may 
therefore affect the model for HIP/minute. 
Furthermore, the percentage of high-intensity aircraft pairs that require 
intervention is not formally defined.  In reality, this number may be higher or lower, 
depending on the situation.  This experiment does test what the number of critical aircraft 
pairs requiring intervention is at different percentages, but a formal definition is lacking.  
The analysis at different levels may reveal a kind of threshold where above a certain 




controllers to handle, or too low to ensure engagement by controllers, but it is also 
possible that a formal definition may be impossible, as the percentage of aircraft which 
require intervention may change in a continuous fashion over time, and is not discrete.   
Additionally, this analysis is static.  That is, it does not account for changes in 
intensity numbers that would occur for each aircraft pair in the sector if a trajectory or 
flight level change was made in the event of controller intervention.  The analysis is only 
based on if aircraft continued uninterrupted on their planned route with no changes 
applied over the 40 minutes of time in the sector.  In implementation, the controllers will 
intervene and make changes to an aircraft’s trajectory in order to manage intensity away 
from criticality, and therefore the number of high intensity aircraft pairs may stabilize or 
change in a different way. 
 This work does not address the possibility of a distributed function among agents.  
It is possible that the monitoring intensity numbers could be distributed between pilots 
via data link or some kind of display in the cockpit and controllers on the ground.  
Previous work has been done to show that automated separation assurance may have 
lower variance in the number of separation losses if the work is distributed amongst pilots 
instead of centralized on the ground (Shortle & Zhang, 2014) (Wing et al., 2013).  While 
this previous work does not account for any human-controller tasks, further work would 
be necessary to determine if a shared responsibility for monitoring intensity control 
numbers between agents would result in a higher level of safety, as actual implementation 
of a shared responsibility or self-separating aircraft is questionable due to workload factor 






Given the results, the intensity control measure is not a safe, implementable task 
for human controllers to manage with increased traffic at this time.  At current traffic 
levels, it is a manageable task with a safe level of HIP at all times.  However, at increased 
traffic levels, the number exceeds the safety threshold of 18 HIP/minute or less, and 




Additionally, it is clear that the initial hypothesis defining HIP as any aircraft pair 
with an intensity number of 6.0 or below definition of HIP may need to change as traffic 
levels increase in order to supply a manageable workload to controllers.  Furthermore, the 
time frame in the definition of intensity (30 seconds or less) may need to be changed in 
order to supply controllers with an appropriate task that is safe to manage and monitor. 
While the analysis shows that under the given circumstances, intensity is not a 
safe measure to use at increased traffic levels, valuable insights are drawn from the data.  
The number of HIP/minute increases by a power of 2.5 as traffic levels increase.  
Because the data is non-normal and contains non-constant variance throughout, 
regression models are not appropriate, however, confidence intervals provide insight into 
where a majority of data points would be expected to fall.  Additionally, a quadratic 
relationship is shown between the difference of the maximum and minimum aircraft pairs 
that exist at a given traffic level and the variance in the number of HIP.  A linear or 
potentially quadratic relationship is also shown between the number of aircrafts in a 
sector at a given minute and the number of HIP present at that time.  The variance in the 
number of HIP/minute plays a role in defining these relationships, but the cause of the 
variance is unknown at this time. 
 
Future Work !! There are several work streams needed in order to continue to test the concept of 
intensity as a function for human controllers to manage in light of automated separation 
assurance. 
 A human-in-the-loop simulation will provide great insight into how controllers 
will apply control to HIP and also if the control applied will solve the problems and lower 
the amount of HIP per minute as time goes on.  This kind of dynamic simulation will 
provide more accurate insight into what HIP/minute, as well as what definition of HIP 
controllers feel is appropriate in a dynamic situation. 
 Next, evaluating the origin and cause of the high, non-constant variance in the 
number of HIP/minute will offer valuable insight into how intensity can be used in the 




in a sector (n) has very high variance in the number of HIP per minute.  It may also 
provide assistance in managing increased air traffic levels, independent of the intensity 
measure.  
 Additionally, it will be necessary to evaluate if the “30 seconds or less” portion of 
the intensity definition is an appropriate measure.  It is possible that more or less time 
may be needed to provide controllers with manageable workload.! !Another facet of this 
work would be to analyze the characteristics of aircraft traffic at current, 1.5x and 2x 
where 18 HIP per minute or less occur.  These characteristics may also offer important 
insight into defining intensity more rigorously and may implicate other portions of 
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Appendix A: Data and Results 
 
A1:  Raw Data  (***Complete sets of all data are available upon request) 
Data was taken from FlightSim in the following abbreviated format 
 
 
From these 162 simulated aircraft flights, 72 were used for data runs.  The data classes 
extracted from the large text files were Timestamp, Latitude, Longitude, Altitude, 
Heading, and Speed. 
 
A2: Refined Data used for 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, and 3.0 analysis, after latitude/longitude 
manipulation 
 
1.0 Traffic Level 
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A3: Matlab Program for Intensity Calculations 
 
datamatrix=[862.0164843 97.88716 2313011.919 764948.6191 34452.128 
888.6669969 133.59648 1903606.81 603786.0821 35331.999 
901.6622926 261.93469 211948.3886 1319359.509 35983.052 
796.7215347 272.49973 1670165.556 1386274.667 32000.005 
874.9089322 282.18923 805124.2234 1337531.615 35980.074 
864.9517731 276.44185 1500258.94 304275.937 36020.181 
755.4623995 302.70429 1564693.119 612551.5419 30019.376 
841.7635046 97.66288 2179453.757 0 33116.485 
879.3127578 266.50285 1792821.554 1398247.513 36021.976 
899.4737099 87.0489 1294180.558 17433689.06 41000.013 
855.0995812 295.82896 238843.9724 1215236.841 32000.013 
809.9333461 89.90798 2221461.189 1189192.159 35993.087 
817.0317387 142.79346 1464471.889 538394.9431 37026.809 
866.5333086 88.90638 2331192.661 1079549.503 39055.639 
827.3579005 348.45866 353606.3492 1072264.961 31994.388 
874.5660319 134.69127 1725189.072 735186.4609 38999.503 
852.464358 257.32575 1471285.464 365096.6096 36060.258 
834.9046068 302.65417 1512502.989 637859.3005 25986.862 
876.6100477 80.05819 2425040.686 1088698.368 35077.709 
874.8985582 110.4265 1990957.878 202372.2864 36980.355 
877.0866947 85.35633 2734984.71 1219315.245 36999.961 
877.4346147 99.79584 2745790.399 833173.228 36999.999 
871.0099754 81.54042 3098470.576 1170976.932 37014.218 
887.2501071 97.04877 1673997.445 949785.1205 35019.664 




896.5062951 279.028 509874.7791 1138952.15 37988.89]; %data points 
velocity (ft/sec), heading (deg), x location (ft), y location (ft) 
psivct=[-90, -45, 0, 15, 30, 45, 90];%degrees degrees of error  
psidot=3; %degrees/sec rate of error change 
d=500; %distance apart for a problem, in feet 
Nr_AC=size(datamatrix,1); %number of aircraft in sector 
 
for c1 = 1:size(psivct,2) 
    psi1=psivct(c1); %for loop to run through array of blunder errors 
     
            






















k5=k1.^2+k3.^2; %"a" in the polynomial 
k6=2*(k1.*k2+k3.*k4); %"b" in the polynomial 
k7=k3.^2+k4.^2-500; %"c" in the polynomial 
p = [k5 k6 k7]; % creating hte polynomial 
r = roots(p); %solving for roots 
if(~isempty(r)) 
    rr(:,c1,n)=real(r)/60; %getting real answers 





    dist(:,n)=real(distance); 
if(~isempty(vertdistance)); 














dlmwrite(filename, pairs, '-append'); 




dlmwrite(filename, dist, '-append'); 




A4: Sample Matlab Output (all matlab outputs available upon request) 
 























Appendix B: Analysis of Results 
 





Algorithm        Gauss-Newton 
Max iterations            200 
Tolerance             0.00001 
 
 
Starting Values for Parameters 
 
Parameter  Value 
Theta1      3.22 










Parameter  Estimate  SE Estimate 
Theta1      211.214      5.98265 
Theta2       -0.725      0.02010 
 
Percentage Safe = Theta1 * exp(Theta2 * traffic) 
 
 
Lack of Fit 
 
Source          DF       SS       MS      F      P 
Error          478  92403.5   193.31 
  Lack of Fit    2   6530.8  3265.40  18.10  0.000 





Iterations       10 
Final SSE   92403.5 
DFE             478 
MSE         193.313 






Variabltraffic N  N*    Mean   SE Mean     StDev  Minimum      Q1  Mediange     
       1.0      120   0  100.00  0.000000  0.000000   100.00  100.00  100.00 
       1.5      120   0   77.13      1.78     19.51    43.00   60.00   75.00 




       3.0      120   0  23.242     0.866     9.482    9.000  17.000  21.000 
 
Variable         traffic      Q3  Maximum 
Percentage Safe  1.0      100.00   100.00 
                 1.5      100.00   100.00 
                 2.0       51.00   100.00 























Variable     N    Mean  StDev  SE Mean       95% CI 
% at 1.5x  120   77.13  19.51     1.78  ( 73.61,  80.66) 
% at 2x    120   45.90  15.85     1.45  ( 43.04,  48.76) 
% at 3x    120  23.242  9.482    0.866  (21.528, 24.956) !!
                                     Confidence 
                          Achieved    Interval 
             N  Median  Confidence  Lower  Upper  Position 
% at 1.5x  120   75.00      0.9448  69.00  81.00        50 
                            0.9500  69.00  81.81       NLI 
                            0.9642  69.00  85.00        49 
% at 2x    120   42.00      0.9448  40.00  45.00        50 
                            0.9500  40.00  45.00       NLI 
                            0.9642  40.00  45.00        49 
% at 3x    120   21.00      0.9448  19.00  22.00        50 
                            0.9500  19.00  22.00       NLI 





Algorithm        Gauss-Newton 
Max iterations            200 
Tolerance             0.00001 
 
 
Starting Values for Parameters 
 
Parameter  Value 
Theta1      6.32 










Parameter  Estimate  SE Estimate 
Theta1      10.4239     0.655037 
Theta2       1.9188     0.062263 
 
HIP = Theta1 * traffic ^ Theta2 
 
 





Source          DF      SS       MS      F      P 
Error          478  112447   235.24 
  Lack of Fit    2    4564  2281.89  10.07  0.000 





Iterations        8 
Final SSE    112447 
DFE             478 
MSE         235.244 






Weights            1/response 
Algorithm        Gauss-Newton 
Max iterations            200 
Tolerance             0.00001 
 
 
Starting Values for Parameters 
 
Parameter  Value 
Theta1      10.4 










Parameter  Estimate  SE Estimate 
Theta1      6.63144     0.324176 
Theta2      2.26349     0.052593 
 
HIP/min = Theta1 * Traffic ^ Theta2 
 
 
Lack of Fit 
 
Source          DF       SS       MS      F      P 
Error          478  2533.54    5.300 
  Lack of Fit    2   358.10  179.052  39.18  0.000 








Iterations        9 
Final SSE   2533.54 
DFE             478 
MSE         5.30028 





















Sign confidence interval for median 
 
                                    Confidence 
                         Achieved    Interval 
            N  Median  Confidence  Lower  Upper  Position 
hip 1.0   120   5.000      0.9448  5.000  6.000        50 
                           0.9500  5.000  6.000       NLI 
                           0.9642  5.000  6.000        49 
hip 1.5x  120   23.50      0.9448  21.00  26.00        50 
                           0.9500  21.00  26.00       NLI 
                           0.9642  21.00  26.00        49 
hip 2x    120   42.00      0.9448  40.00  45.00        50 
                           0.9500  40.00  45.00       NLI 
                           0.9642  40.00  45.00        49 
hip 3x    120   84.00      0.9448  79.00  91.00        50 
                           0.9500  79.00  91.00       NLI 










Categorical predictor coding  (1, 0) 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source       DF  Adj SS  Adj MS  F-Value  P-Value 
Regression    3  420072  140024   617.81    0.000 
  traffic     3  420072  140024   617.81    0.000 
Error       476  107883     227 





      S    R-sq  R-sq(adj)  R-sq(pred) 





Term       Coef  SE Coef  T-Value  P-Value   VIF 
Constant   5.23     1.37     3.80    0.000 
traffic 
  1.5     18.09     1.94     9.31    0.000  1.50 
  2.0     37.30     1.94    19.19    0.000  1.50 









Fits and Diagnostics for Unusual Observations 
 
Obs     HIP    Fit   Resid  Std Resid 
 84   73.00  42.53   30.47       2.03  R 
121   51.00  84.84  -33.84      -2.26  R 
124  139.00  84.84   54.16       3.61  R 
125  131.00  84.84   46.16       3.08  R 
126  142.00  84.84   57.16       3.81  R 
127  139.00  84.84   54.16       3.61  R 
128  131.00  84.84   46.16       3.08  R 
129  125.00  84.84   40.16       2.68  R 
132  122.00  84.84   37.16       2.48  R 
137  115.00  84.84   30.16       2.01  R 
139  116.00  84.84   31.16       2.08  R 
140  116.00  84.84   31.16       2.08  R 
141  126.00  84.84   41.16       2.75  R 
142  121.00  84.84   36.16       2.41  R 
281   47.00  84.84  -37.84      -2.52  R 
282   54.00  84.84  -30.84      -2.06  R 




285  122.00  84.84   37.16       2.48  R 
286  130.00  84.84   45.16       3.01  R 
287  126.00  84.84   41.16       2.75  R 
288  122.00  84.84   37.16       2.48  R 
317   54.00  84.84  -30.84      -2.06  R 
318   52.00  84.84  -32.84      -2.19  R 
441   29.00  84.84  -55.84      -3.72  R 
442   37.00  84.84  -47.84      -3.19  R 
470   49.00  84.84  -35.84      -2.39  R 
471   44.00  84.84  -40.84      -2.72  R 
472   45.00  84.84  -39.84      -2.66  R 
473   46.00  84.84  -38.84      -2.59  R 
474   44.00  84.84  -40.84      -2.72  R 
475   41.00  84.84  -43.84      -2.92  R 
476   42.00  84.84  -42.84      -2.86  R 
477   35.00  84.84  -49.84      -3.32  R 
478   30.00  84.84  -54.84      -3.66  R 
 







Categorical predictor coding  (1, 0) 
Weights                       1/response 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source       DF  Adj SS   Adj MS  F-Value  P-Value 
Regression    3   10563  3520.88   770.39    0.000 
  Traffic     3   10563  3520.88   770.39    0.000 
Error       476    2175     4.57 





      S    R-sq  R-sq(adj)  R-sq(pred) 





Term        Coef  SE Coef  T-Value  P-Value   VIF 
Constant   4.337    0.406    10.67    0.000 
Traffic 
  1.5     14.956    0.949    15.77    0.000  1.03 
  2.0      34.22     1.28    26.77    0.000  1.02 








HIP/min = 4.337 +†0.0†Traffic_1.0 +†14.956†Traffic_1.5 +†34.22†Traffic_2.0 
          +†71.25†Traffic_3.0 
 
 
Fits and Diagnostics for Unusual Observations 
 
Obs  HIP/min    Fit   Resid  Std Resid 
124   139.00  75.59   63.41       2.52  R 
125   131.00  75.59   55.41       2.27  R 
126   142.00  75.59   66.41       2.61  R 
127   139.00  75.59   63.41       2.52  R 
128   131.00  75.59   55.41       2.27  R 
129   125.00  75.59   49.41       2.07  R 
141   126.00  75.59   50.41       2.11  R 
284   126.00  75.59   50.41       2.11  R 
286   130.00  75.59   54.41       2.24  R 
287   126.00  75.59   50.41       2.11  R 
361     6.00  19.29  -13.29      -2.57  R  X 
364     4.00  19.29  -15.29      -3.65  R  X 
400     7.00  19.29  -12.29      -2.20  R 
437    15.00  38.56  -23.56      -2.88  R 
438    15.00  38.56  -23.56      -2.88  R 
441    29.00  75.59  -46.59      -4.09  R 
442    37.00  75.59  -38.59      -2.99  R 
471    44.00  75.59  -31.59      -2.24  R 
472    45.00  75.59  -30.59      -2.15  R 
473    46.00  75.59  -29.59      -2.06  R 
474    44.00  75.59  -31.59      -2.24  R 
475    41.00  75.59  -34.59      -2.55  R 
476    42.00  75.59  -33.59      -2.44  R 
477    35.00  75.59  -40.59      -3.24  R 
478    30.00  75.59  -45.59      -3.94  R 
 
R  Large residual 














Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF  Adj SS  Adj MS  F-Value  P-Value 
Regression       2  453458  226729  1451.74    0.000 
  n              1   11306   11306    72.39    0.000 
  n*n            1       1       1     0.00    0.950 
Error          477   74497     156 
  Lack-of-Fit   21    7634     364     2.48    0.000 
  Pure Error   456   66863     147 








      S    R-sq  R-sq(adj)  R-sq(pred) 





Term         Coef  SE Coef  T-Value  P-Value    VIF 




n           3.860    0.454     8.51    0.000  39.53 





HIP = -37.24 +†3.860†n +†0.00062†n*n 
 
 
Fits and Diagnostics for Unusual Observations 
 
Obs     HIP     Fit   Resid  Std Resid 
 84   73.00   40.20   32.80       2.63  R 
123   88.00   55.75   32.25       2.59  R 
124  139.00   90.80   48.20       3.87  R 
125  131.00   98.60   32.40       2.61  R 
126  142.00  102.51   39.49       3.19  R 
127  139.00  102.51   36.49       2.95  R 
128  131.00  102.51   28.49       2.30  R 
140  116.00   90.80   25.20       2.03  R 
141  126.00   98.60   27.40       2.21  R 
149  110.00   75.21   34.79       2.79  R 
150  101.00   71.31   29.69       2.38  R 
159  112.00   63.53   48.47       3.89  R 
160   96.00   59.64   36.36       2.92  R 
283   85.00   55.75   29.25       2.35  R 
284  126.00   90.80   35.20       2.83  R 
286  130.00  102.51   27.49       2.22  R 
319   91.00   63.53   27.47       2.20  R 
450   72.00   98.60  -26.60      -2.14  R 
451   72.00   98.60  -26.60      -2.14  R 
453   64.00   90.80  -26.80      -2.15  R 
454   68.00   98.60  -30.60      -2.47  R 
455   72.00   98.60  -26.60      -2.14  R 
462   73.00   98.60  -25.60      -2.06  R 
463   65.00  102.51  -37.51      -3.03  R 
464   59.00   98.60  -39.60      -3.19  R 
465   59.00  102.51  -43.51      -3.51  R 
471   44.00   71.31  -27.31      -2.19  R 
472   45.00   71.31  -26.31      -2.11  R 
473   46.00   71.31  -25.31      -2.03  R 
474   44.00   71.31  -27.31      -2.19  R 
478   30.00   71.31  -41.31      -3.32  R 
 











Rounded λ               0.390046 
Estimated λ             0.390046 
95% CI for λ            (0.329546, 0.451546) 
 
 
Analysis of Variance for Transformed Response 
 
Source          DF   Adj SS   Adj MS  F-Value  P-Value 
Regression       2   891.63  445.814  1741.84    0.000 
  n              1   129.50  129.500   505.97    0.000 
  n*n            1    46.84   46.840   183.01    0.000 
Error          477   122.09    0.256 
  Lack-of-Fit   21    25.53    1.216     5.74    0.000 
  Pure Error   456    96.55    0.212 
Total          479  1013.71 
 
 
Model Summary for Transformed Response 
 
       S    R-sq  R-sq(adj)  R-sq(pred) 






Coefficients for Transformed Response 
 
Term           Coef   SE Coef  T-Value  P-Value    VIF 
Constant     -1.925     0.187   -10.27    0.000 
n            0.4131    0.0184    22.49    0.000  39.53 





HIP^0.390046 = -1.925 +†0.4131†n -†0.005409†n*n 
 
 




Obs      HIP     Fit 
 42   23.000   8.022 
 43   26.000   8.022 
 50   32.000  13.978 
 51   39.000  17.499 
 74   26.000  10.808 
 76   28.000  10.808 
 77   27.000  10.808 
 78   26.000  10.808 
 84   73.000  38.952 
124  139.000  91.230 
159  112.000  67.079 
203   24.000   8.022 
210   31.000  13.978 
211   37.000  17.499 
437   15.000  34.296 
438   15.000  34.296 
465   59.000  96.110 
471   44.000  75.442 
474   44.000  75.442 





Obs    HIP'     Fit    Resid  Std Resid 
 42  3.3973  2.2527   1.1446       2.27  R 
 43  3.5637  2.2527   1.3110       2.60  R 
 50  3.8644  2.7975   1.0668       2.11  R 
 51  4.1743  3.0537   1.1206       2.22  R 
 74  3.5637  2.5305   1.0332       2.05  R 
 76  3.6682  2.5305   1.1377       2.25  R 
 77  3.6166  2.5305   1.0860       2.15  R 
 78  3.5637  2.5305   1.0332       2.05  R 
 84  5.3307  4.1723   1.1583       2.29  R 
124  6.8529  5.8149   1.0380       2.06  R 
159  6.2993  5.1576   1.1416       2.26  R 
203  3.4542  2.2527   1.2015       2.38  R 
210  3.8168  2.7975   1.0193       2.02  R 
211  4.0895  3.0537   1.0358       2.05  R 
437  2.8756  3.9703  -1.0946      -2.17  R 
438  2.8756  3.9703  -1.0946      -2.17  R 




471  4.3754  5.3995  -1.0241      -2.03  R 
474  4.3754  5.3995  -1.0241      -2.03  R 
478  3.7683  5.3995  -1.6312      -3.23  R 
 
HIP' = transformed response 
R  Large residual !
 
&




              Total 
Variable  n   Count    Mean  SE Mean  StDev  Variance  CoefVar  Minimum     Q1  
Median 
HIP       10      3   6.000    0.577  1.000     1.000    16.67    5.000  5.000   
6.000 
          11     54   5.019    0.282  2.069     4.283    41.24    2.000  3.000   
5.000 
          12     72   6.736    0.562  4.765    22.704    70.74    2.000  4.000   
6.000 
          13     30   16.87     1.14   6.25     39.09    37.07     4.00  11.75   
17.50 
          14     15   21.73     1.72   6.65     44.21    30.59    10.00  16.00   
21.00 
          15      9   28.56     2.76   8.29     68.78    29.04    14.00  22.50   
30.00 
          16     21   24.29     1.38   6.31     39.81    25.98    13.00  18.00   
27.00 
          17     24   27.33     1.49   7.30     53.36    26.73    13.00  25.00   
27.50 
          18     18   35.11     1.99   8.46     71.52    24.09    23.00  25.75   
35.50 
          19     12   31.00     3.25  11.26    126.73    36.31    15.00  24.25   
30.00 
          20     27   40.85     2.80  14.57    212.28    35.67    20.00  33.00   
40.00 
          21     36   43.86     1.55   9.32     86.92    21.26    24.00  37.00   
45.50 
          22     30   45.00     1.81   9.93     98.62    22.07    26.00  39.75   
45.50 
          23      6   45.33     4.77  11.67    136.27    25.75    29.00  36.50   
44.00 
          24     18   57.17     3.73  15.84    250.97    27.71    35.00  41.50   
55.50 
          25      6   68.67     7.85  19.22    369.47    27.99    41.00  51.50   
71.00 
          26      3    89.7     13.3   23.0     530.3    25.68     66.0   66.0    
91.0 
          28     18   64.11     4.41  18.71    350.22    29.19    30.00  45.75   
66.50 
          29      3    87.0     14.6   25.2     637.0    29.01     60.0   60.0    
91.0 
          30      6   80.33     7.51  18.40    338.67    22.91    56.00  59.00   
85.00 





          34      9   94.67     5.43  16.29    265.50    17.21    72.00  80.50   
96.00 
          35     30   95.37     3.54  19.40    376.17    20.34    59.00  76.00   
96.00 




Variable  n       Q3  Maximum    IQR  Skewness 
HIP       10   7.000    7.000  2.000      0.00 
          11   6.000   10.000  3.000      0.29 
          12   8.000   26.000  4.000      2.44 
          13   22.25    28.00  10.50     -0.03 
          14   28.00    32.00  12.00      0.03 
          15   36.00    39.00  13.50     -0.43 
          16   29.00    33.00  11.00     -0.35 
          17   31.75    38.00   6.75     -0.39 
          18   41.00    52.00  15.25      0.12 
          19   40.25    52.00  16.00      0.27 
          20   48.00    73.00  15.00      0.48 
          21   51.00    59.00  14.00     -0.26 
          22   51.75    62.00  12.00     -0.24 
          23   56.00    62.00  19.50      0.11 
          24   68.50    88.00  27.00      0.43 
          25   82.50    96.00  31.00     -0.09 
          26   112.0    112.0   46.0     -0.26 
          28   80.00   101.00  34.25      0.02 
          29   110.0    110.0   50.0     -0.70 
          30   96.50   101.00  37.50     -0.51 
          33  114.25   139.00  43.00      0.20 
          34  110.50   116.00  30.00      0.04 
          35  109.25   131.00  33.25      0.02 
          36  127.00   142.00  40.50     -0.25 
 
 
B11: Max-min aircraft pairs vs. Variance 
 
 

















Max Unique Pairs - Min Unique Pairs 
Difference in Unique Pairs vs. 
Variance 
